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ARTICLES

THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AND THE
CONCEPT OF STATE PRACTICE
A. MARK WEISBURD*
ABSTRACT
State practice is an important element of international law, both
as a key component of customary international law and as a crucial
tool for interpreting treaties. In this Article, the Author seeks to
show that there are important flaws in the International Court of
Justice’s application of state practice. The Court has relied on
actual practice to determine the content of customary rules
surprisingly rarely, instead frequently basing its conclusions
instead on non-binding actions by international bodies or on its
own decisions. In some cases, it has reached decisions clearly
inconsistent with significant and relevant state practice; in others, it
has proclaimed doctrines unsupported by state behavior as rules of
law. The Court has been inconsistent in its treatment of the
practice of parties to treaties in cases presenting interpretation
questions, sometimes proclaiming the necessity of relying on such
practice while on other occasions failing even to acknowledge the
existence of practice contrary to the result it reaches. This behavior
by the Court is problematic for a number of reasons and,
paradoxically, makes the Court itself an impediment to wider
reliance on international law.
1.

INTRODUCTION

* Martha M. Brandis Professor of Law, University of North Carolina at
Chapel Hill. The Author gratefully acknowledges the support of the Carolina
Law Foundation in the preparation of this Article.
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Among international lawyers, there is no dispute that
determining the precise content of customary international law
(“CIL”) is difficult, and that treaty terms are not always easy to
construe. In such circumstances, there would be obvious utility in
establishing an impartial tribunal composed of experts in
international law who can resolve inter-state disputes by sorting
out the complexities of CIL and applying their expertise to
questions of treaty interpretation. Of course, states have attempted
to do just that, starting with the Permanent Court of International
Justice (“PCIJ”) and replacing that court with the International
Court of Justice (“ICJ” or the Court) after World War II. While a
number of specialized international tribunals have been created in
recent decades, the ICJ remains the only international tribunal
whose jurisdiction is not limited to a specific subject matter.
Assessments of the Court vary. There is, to be sure, much
reason to see the ICJ as important and useful. The Charter of the
United Nations declares the ICJ to be “the principal judicial organ
of the United Nations.”1 The task of electing the judges of the
court is seen as a matter of sufficient moment to require the
participation of both the General Assembly and the Security
Council of the United Nations.2 Scholarly assessment is generally
favorable. For instance, according to the Third Restatement of
Foreign Relations Law, “to the extent that decisions of
international tribunals adjudicate questions of international law,
they are persuasive evidence of what the law is. The judgments
and opinions of the International Court of Justice are accorded
great weight.”3 One can find similar statements in the writings of
highly regarded scholars of international law. As an example,
Judge Cassese has observed:
[G]iven the rudimentary character of international law, and
the lack of both a central lawmaking body and a central
judicial institution endowed with compulsory jurisdiction,
in practice many decisions of the most authoritative courts
(in particular the ICJ) are bound to have crucial importance
in establishing the existence of customary rules, or in
1 U.N.

Charter art. 92.
Charter Statute of the International Court of Justice arts. 4–12, 59 Stat.
1031, U.N.T.S. 993 [hereinafter I.C.J. Statute].
3 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES,
§ 103 cmt. b (1987).
2 U.N.
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defining their scope and content, or in promoting the
evolution of new concepts.4
Further, a casebook widely used in American law schools
states, “the decisions of the International Court of Justice are, on
the whole, regarded by international lawyers as highly persuasive
authority of existing international law.”5
Despite the foregoing, it is also true that particular ICJ
decisions have been strongly criticized. For example, the Court’s
decision in the merits phase of Military and Paramilitary Activities in
and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.)6 drew highly critical comments
from several commentators;7 its decisions in Oil Platforms (Iran v.
United States)8 and Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall9
also received a fair amount of negative reaction.10 Generally,
4 ANTONIO

CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 159 (2001).
LORI F. DAMROSCH ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 134–35
(4th ed. 2001).
6 Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 118–119
(June 27) (holding that the United States’ unsolicited collective self-defense efforts
in Nicaragua violated the customary international law established through the
U.N. Charter).
7 See, e.g., Anthony D’Amato, Trashing Customary International Law, 81 AM. J.
INT’L L. 101, 102 (1987) (arguing that the ICJ’s reliance on the U.N. Charter rather
than state practice as the source of customary international law in Nicar. v. U.S.
misunderstood the purpose of customary law); Thomas M. Franck, Some
Observations on the ICJ’s Procedural and Substantive Innovations, 81 AM. J. INT’L L.
116, 116–120 (1987) (disagreeing with the ICJ’s holding in Nicar. v. U.S. because of
the court’s weighting of evidence, interpretation of customary international law,
and interpretation of the substantive principle of collective self-defense); John
Lawrence Hargrove, The Nicaragua Judgment and the Future of the Law of Force and
Self-Defense, 81 AM. J. INT’L L. 135, 137–43 (1987) (arguing that the ICJ proceeded
beyond interpreting the U.N. Charter in Nicar. v. U.S. and weakened the
international right of self-defense as a result).
8 Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 165, 196–198 (Nov. 6) (holding that
the U.S. destruction of Iranian oil platforms in the Persian Gulf was not a valid
use of self-defense, since it was not objectively shown that self-defense was
necessary).
9 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory (Wall Case), Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 201 (July 9)
(holding that Israel’s construction of a wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory
was contrary to international law).
10 For reaction to the Oil Platforms case, see William H. Taft, IV, Self-Defense
and the Oil Platforms Decision, 29 YALE J. INT’L L. 295, 298–306 (2004) (arguing that
the ICJ’s ruling on self-defense in Oil Platforms was not only unnecessary to decide
the particular dispute, but also could be read to unduly limit the right of selfdefense); Ruth Wedgwood, The ICJ Advisory Opinion on the Israeli Security Fence
and the Limits of Self-Defense, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 52, 52, 57–61 (2005) (arguing that the
ICJ’s holding in Oil Platforms limited the right of self-defense to situations where
5
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however, critics have focused on the results in individual cases,
rather than on evaluating the Court’s overall performance.
To understand why this lack of more general analyses of the
Court is important, it is crucial to realize that the authority
expressly vested in the Court is rather limited. Under its Statute,
the ICJ has jurisdiction in contentious cases only when the states
involved in the dispute have consented to that jurisdiction.11
Further, the Statute provides that the ICJ’s decisions are binding
only “between the parties and in respect of that particular case.”12
Also, no international instrument provides for the enforcement of
the ICJ’s judgments except Article 94 of the Charter of the United
Nations, which leaves to the discretion of the Security Council the
issue of whether to enforce any particular judgment.13 These
provisions, taken together, make it impossible for the ICJ to control
the interpretation of international law in the way, for example, that
the Supreme Court of the United States can control interpretation
of the Constitution. Or, more precisely, these provisions indicate
the refusal of the states which established the ICJ to confer upon it
a competence to make determinations of the content of
the threat was already too severe and hindered states’ ability to protect civilians
through action that is valid under international law as self-defense). For reaction
to the Wall case, see Sean D. Murphy, Self-Defense and the Israeli Wall Advisory
Opinion: An Ipse Dixit from the ICJ?, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 62 (2005) (arguing that the
ICJ’s holding in the Wall Case lacked extensive factual analysis or sufficiently
deep reasoning); Michla Pomerance, The ICJ’s Advisory Jurisdiction and the
Crumbling Wall Between the Political and the Judicial, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 26, 32–42
(2005) (arguing that the ICJ’s decision in the Wall Case was unduly influenced by
political considerations).
11 This consent may be ad hoc. I.C.J. Statute, supra note 2, art. 36, para. 1.
Alternatively, this consent may take the form of a provision in a treaty providing
that disputes involving that treaty shall be resolved by the ICJ—an advance
consent, in other words. See also SHABTAI ROSENNE, 2 THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF
THE INTERNATIONAL COURT 1920-2005, 645–49 (4th ed. 2006) (explaining the role of
compromissory clauses in bilateral and multilateral treaties). In addition, the
Statute permits states to declare their consent generally to the ICJ’s compulsory
jurisdiction in cases wherein the other parties have similarly consented. I.C.J.
Statute, supra note 2, art. 36, para. 2. Relatively few states have accepted
jurisdiction under this provision—sixty-five states currently have made
declarations under Article 36, Paragraph 2, not including four of the five
permanent members of the Security Council (China, France, Russia, the United
States) or such important states as Brazil, South Africa, or Venezuela.
International Court of Justice, Declarations Recognizing the Jurisdiction of the
Court as Compulsory, http://www.icj-cij.org/jurisdiction/index.php?p1=5
&p2=1&p3=3 (last visited Dec. 3, 2009).
12 I.C.J. Statute, supra note 2, art. 59.
13 U.N. Charter, art. 94.
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international law which, as a practical matter, can be made binding
on the world.
In these circumstances, the Court’s ability to resolve individual
disputes and its capacity to clarify the content of international law
depend on states’ willingness to bring cases to it, which in part
depends on the perceived quality of its work. Even if it lacks the
authority to make generally binding legal determinations, states
can and presumably will accept its view of the law if they perceive
the Court as an institution upon which they can rely for a careful
resolution of legal questions. Similar considerations, one would
hope, would apply to scholars seeking to determine whether the
Court is a reliable expositor of international law. In
this
connection, a distinction drawn by Professor Movsesian is helpful.
He distinguishes between judicial decisions having what he calls
“disposition value”—decisions which lower courts are obliged to
accept as stating the law because of the place of the deciding court
in the relevant judicial hierarchy—and decisions having
“information value”—decisions which another court is not legally
obliged to follow, but which are nonetheless influential because of
the expertise of the court and the quality of its analysis.14 Thus, the
ICJ’s expertise in matters of international law could be so great as
to make its opinions influential with national courts, governments,
and scholars, regardless of their formally binding character. On
the other hand, if analysis gives reason to question the quality of
the Court’s work, states will be on notice of the risks of taking
cases to the Court, and scholars will learn to treat its opinions with
caution.
This Article attempts such an analysis of one aspect of the
Court’s jurisprudence: its treatment of state practice. The
significance of state practice in international law is difficult to
overstate. It is accepted as a component of CIL.15 Furthermore, the
practice of states’ parties to a particular treaty is understood to be
an important element in determining the treaty’s meaning.16

14 See Mark L. Movsesian, Judging International Judgments, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 65,
88–89 (2007) (describing the domestic effects of international judgments in
countries that utilize a “dualist” approach).
15 I.C.J. Statute, supra note 2, art. 38.
16 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31, para. 3(b), May 23, 1969,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Treaties Convention].
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Indeed, the Court itself has stated that the use of parties’ practice to
interpret treaties is an element of CIL.17
In light of the significance of state practice, the ICJ’s approach
to determining its content and relevance can shed considerable
light on the Court’s actual performance of its task. Accordingly
this Article will, in the next Section, discuss twenty-seven cases
decided by the ICJ over the period 1984–2007,18 highlighting the
approach taken in the cases to issues involving the relationship
between state practice on the one hand and either determination of
the content of a CIL rule, or interpretation of a treaty, on the
other.19 That Section will be organized according to the various
ways the Court can deal with state practice. For example, it might
rely heavily on state practice to decide a case turning on a point of
CIL, or, conversely, pay no attention to existing state practice in
such a case. The following Section will analyze the Court’s
performance as revealed in the case narratives. The last Section
will conclude.
2.

STATE PRACTICE IN THE ICJ, 1984-2007

As noted above, state practice is central to analysis of CIL
questions, and can be relevant to treaty analysis as well. The
following discussion will treat these two types of cases separately.
These two subsections will then be further divided according to the
way the Court dealt with state practice. Some cases involve more
17 See Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Sal. v. Hond., Nicar.
intervening), 1992 I.C.J. 351, 586 (Sept. 11) (“The Chamber considers that . . .
customary law contemplate[s] that such practice may be taken into account for
purposes of interpretation . . . .”).
18 This period was selected because 1984 was the year the application was
filed in Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27), a
case which focused considerable attention on the Court’s use of state practice.
19 In East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), 1995 I.C.J. 90 (Jun. 30), states’ practice of
concluding treaties with Indonesia capable of application in a territory, the status
of which was in dispute, was relied on by the Court to show that those states had
not read certain United Nations resolutions as requiring them not to recognize
Indonesian control over the territory. Id. at 103. In Application of the Convention on
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Yugo.), 1996
I.C.J. 595 (July 11), states’ practice in recognizing the status of the head of state of
Bosnia-Herzegovina by acknowledging the force of treaties bearing his signature
was relied on as part of the reason to reject an argument that the head of state
lacked capacity to formally approve Bosnia-Herzegovina’s decision to bring the
case. In both of these cases, state practice was relevant only as evidence of states’
attitudes toward a particular fact situation, not as an element in the determination
of the content of a rule of law. This Article therefore does not address these cases.
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than one type of analysis, and therefore will be discussed in more
than one place.
2.1. CIL
2.1.1.

Introduction

Article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ sets out the sources from
which the Court is required to draw the legal rules it applies:
Article 38
1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance
with international law such disputes as are submitted to it,
shall apply:
a. international conventions, whether general or
particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the
contesting states;
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice
accepted as law;
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized
nations;
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial
decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified
publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for
the determination of rules of law.
2. This provision shall not prejudice the power of the Court
to decide a case ex aequo et bono, the parties agree thereto.20
According to the Statute, therefore, customary law is to be
derived from the “general practice of states.” The International
Law Association has provided the following working definition of
customary international law:
(i) Subject to the Sections which follow, a rule of customary
international law is one which is created and sustained by
the constant and uniform practice of States and other
subjects of international law in or impinging upon their
20 I.C.J.

Statute, supra note 2, art. 38.
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international legal relations, in circumstances which give
rise to a legitimate expectation of similar conduct in the
future.
(ii) If a sufficiently extensive and representative number of
States participate in such a practice in a consistent manner,
the resulting rule is one of “general customary international
law”. Subject to Section 15, such a rule is binding on all
States.21
Some sense of the ICJ’s own sense of the application of Article
38(1)(b) is provided by its decision in the North Sea Continental Shelf
Cases (F.R.G. v. Denmark; F.R.G v. Netherlands).22 Regarding the
argument that the Convention on the Continental Shelf had passed
into customary international law, the Court stated:
With respect to the other elements usually regarded as
necessary before a conventional rule can be considered to
have become a general rule of international law, it might be
that, even without the passage of any considerable period
of time, a very widespread and representative participation
in the convention might suffice of itself, provided it
included that of States whose interests were specially
affected.23
Putting these two discussions together, it seems fair to argue
that it is necessary that a significant number of states follow a
practice before it can be labeled a rule of customary law. We also

21 Comm. on Formation of Customary (Gen.) Int’l Law, Int’l Law Ass’n, Final
Report of the Committee: Statement of Principles Applicable to the Formation of General
Customary International Law, 69 INT’L L. ASS’N REP. CONF. 712, 719 (2000).
22 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (F.R.G. v. Den.; F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969
I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 20).
23 Id. at 42. In this case, the Court held that the number of states adhering to
the Convention at the relevant time was insufficient to establish that its rules had
become CIL. There were thirty-nine parties to that Convention as of the date of
the Court’s decision. See U.N. Treaty Series, Convention on the Continental Shelf,
http://treaties.un.org (follow "U.N. Treaty Series" hyperlink; scroll and select
"Continental Shelf Convention"; select "see details"). Meanwhile the membership
of the United Nations on that date (including land-locked states and others
uninterested in the Convention, was 126. See United Nations, Growth in United
Nations Membership, 1945–present, http://www.un.org/members
/growth.shtml (last visited Dec. 3, 2009) (listing countries that joined the United
Nations year by year).
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see that, in the opinion of the International Law Association, the
practice must be uniform, which makes sense: it is difficult to
characterize as a custom a practice some members of a group
follow and other members of the same group do not.
At this point, a definition is necessary. The term “state
practice” could conceivably be held to apply to anything done by
someone who is part of the state apparatus. If the term is applied
so broadly, however, it would seem to cover a large enough range
of behaviors to confuse analysis; very different sorts of state action
would be lumped together. Therefore, I propose to limit the use of
the term “state practice” to behaviors respecting a particular issue
that amounts to direct action by, or has a direct effect on, the state
whose behavior is in question. For example, resolving a border
dispute by sending military units to occupy the disputed border
would clearly amount to state practice under this definition. So
would a formal proclamation by which a state claimed the territory
at issue, or a diplomatic protest of another state’s occupying that
territory. On the other hand, a state representative’s vote in favor
of a non-binding resolution in some international body taking a
position on a border dispute to which the voting state was not a
party would have no effect on that state, and would therefore not
count under this definition. A fortiori, a state’s vote for a nonbinding resolution purporting to establish general rules for
addressing border disputes—since no specific issue would be
involved—would likewise not count under this definition.
The reason for this distinction is to highlight the difference
between behavior which a state’s officials should see as
committing the state in some way and behavior not likely to be
seen by such officials as a commitment. In the former case, the
state has to be prepared to deal with other states’ reactions to its
behavior. In the latter, there may well be no reactions to consider.
Clearly then, a state must carefully consider behaviors of the first
sort, while one cannot assume that state officials will seriously
ponder the consequences of behaviors of the second sort.
Finally, note Article 38(1)(d) of the I.C.J. statute. That provision
permits the Court to rely on judicial opinions and scholarly
commentary, but only as subsidiary means of determining the
content of international law. Those sources, that is, are not
equivalent to the general practice of states. Further, reliance on
judicial decisions is made subject to Article 59 of the Statute, which
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provides that the Court’s decisions have “no binding force except
between the parties and in respect of that particular case.”24 Stare
decisis, in other words, is rejected as a generator of rules of
international law.
In examining the Court’s decisions regarding customary
international law, then, we would expect the Court to derive the
rules it applies from commitment-generating state behavior.
2.1.2.

CIL Cases—Rule of Decision Derived from Description of
State Practice

While the ICJ decided a number of cases during this period on
the basis of CIL, only one turned on a rule of CIL which the Court
derived from explicitly described state practice. Two others relied
on more or less generally described state practice as one of the
sources of the rule applied, but relied on non-practice based
sources as well. Finally, the Court decided one case based on the
absence of state practice supporting the rule for which the
applicant contended.
The case turning on a rule derived from state practice was
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion
(Nuclear Weapons Case).25 That case was produced in response to
the General Assembly’s December, 1994, question: “Is the threat or
use of nuclear weapons in any circumstance permitted under
international law?”26
The Court first addressed the question whether any treaty
clearly prohibited the use of or threat to use nuclear weapons,
concluding, as will be discussed in more detail below, that none
did.27 The Court then moved on to examine the customary law on
the subject. It initially took the orthodox position that the
substance of customary law depended mainly on state practice and
state views of opinio juris.28 States arguing against the legality of
nuclear weapons had asserted that the fact of their non-use
subsequent to World War II established a customary rule of
Statute, supra note 2, art. 59.
of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996
I.C.J. 226 (July 8) (Nuclear Weapons Case).
26 Id. at 227–28.
27 Id. at 247–53. See also infra notes 249–52
and accompanying text.
(discussing the Court’s method of interpreting treaties asserted to prohibit the
threat or use of nuclear weapons).
28 Nuclear Weapons Case, 1996 I.C.J. at 253.
24 I.C.J.

25 Legality
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prohibition, while those taking the opposite view stressed the
significance of the reliance on nuclear weapons for deterrence.29 In
rejecting the argument that this history established a customary
law prohibition, the Court stated:
The Court does not intend to pronounce here upon the
practice known as the “policy of deterrence.” It notes that it
is a fact that a number of States adhered to that practice
during the greater part of the Cold War and continue to
adhere to it. Furthermore, the members of the international
community are profoundly divided on the matter of
whether non-recourse to nuclear weapons over the past 50
years constitutes the expression of an opinio juris. Under
these circumstances the Court does not consider itself able
to find that there is such an opinio juris.30
Nuclear weapons opponents also put forward certain General
Assembly resolutions as confirming a customary law prohibition
on such weapons. The Court responded to this point by
acknowledging that such resolutions “can, in certain
circumstances, provide evidence important for establishing the
existence of a rule or the emergence of an opinio juris,”31 but
asserted that whether any particular resolution should be
understood as having this effect depended on the resolution’s
content, on the circumstances of its adoption, and on whether
opinio juris existed regarding the resolution’s status.32 The
resolutions in question here, the Court held, could not be seen as
demonstrating an opinio juris with respect to nuclear weapons
because substantial numbers of states either voted against their
adoption or abstained on the matter.33
Turning finally to international humanitarian law, the Court
asserted that the principal treaties in the field have entered
customary law, relying in part on the extensive number of parties
to those treaties and on the fact that no state had ever taken
advantage of the denunciation clauses of those treaties.34 The
29 Id.

at 253–54.
at 254 (italics in original).
31 Id. at 254–55 (italics in original).
32 Id. at 255.
33 Id.
34 Id. at 257–58.
30 Id.
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question then became whether customary international
humanitarian law derived from those treaties rendered illegal the
threat or use of nuclear weapons. The Court specifically addressed
the effect on CIL of Additional Protocol 1 to the 1949 Geneva
Conventions35 (treating the matter as one of CIL presumably
because of the protocol’s non-ratification by three of the five
nuclear powers) concluding that the conference which drafted that
treaty produced no substantive debate on nuclear weapons and
adopted no provisions addressed to them, and that the Additional
Protocol therefore did not affect otherwise subsisting customary
law regarding nuclear weapons.36
The Court finally confronted squarely the question of the
compatibility of nuclear weapons with purely customary
international humanitarian law. Its response was to evade the
question. On the one hand, the Court observed that it could not
pass on the argument that nuclear weapons could lawfully be used
in certain limited circumstances, since the proponents of that view
could not be precise in identifying those circumstances.37 On the
other hand, the Court—though observing that the use of nuclear
weapons “seems scarcely compatible with respect” for
humanitarian law principles—concluded that it lacked the basis for
concluding that the use of nuclear weapons could never be lawful.
The Court fortified this conclusion by reference to the fundamental
character of a state’s right to survival and thus of its right to selfdefense in circumstances threatening its survival, on deterrence as
a matter of state practice, and on the reservations by nuclear
weapons states to the various treaties addressing those weapons,
under which those states reserved the right to use such weapons in
defined circumstances.38
Ultimately, with respect to the crucial issue in the case, the
Court’s conclusion, expressed in paragraph 2(e) of the disposition
in this case, was
that the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally
be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in
35 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 1),
June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3.
36 Nuclear Weapons Case, 1996 I.C.J. at 259.
37 Id. at 262.
38 Id. at 262–63.
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armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of
humanitarian law;
However, in view of the current state of international law,
and of the elements of fact at its disposal, the Court cannot
conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear
weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme
circumstance of self-defence, in which the very survival of a
State would be at stake ....... 39
Paragraph 2(e) was adopted only by the casting vote of the
President, showing how deeply divided the Court was regarding
this case; indeed, the scope of the division may have been even
greater than this result suggests.40 Nonetheless, the Court as a
body was unwilling to ignore states’ actual behavior regarding an
issue as fundamental as the legality of nuclear weapons.
The first case relying on state practice as one among several
sources of CIL rules was Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v.
Malta).41 The parties in this case sought from the court a
delimitation between their continental shelves, agreeing that their
dispute had to be resolved according to CIL as it related to such
delimitations.42
The Court relied solely on state practice in parts of its
judgment. Regarding the issue of the place in customary law of a

39 Id.

at 266.
fourteen judges hearing this case wrote separate opinions. Id. at 268–
593. Given the outcome, it is surprising to note that eight of them seem to have
been unwilling to treat state practice regarding nuclear weapons, as well as the
implications of various treaties and Security Council resolutions on the subject, as
controlling the question of the legality of the use of those weapons. Instead, most
of these eight (all but Judge Herczegh), put controlling weight on some
combination of ethical or general legal principles, General Assembly resolutions,
or the asserted irrelevance of state practice. Id. at 269–70 (declaration of Bedjaoui,
Pres.); id. at 275 (declaration of Herczegh, J.); id. at 278 (declaration of Shi, J.); id. at
280–81 (declaration of Vereshchetin, J.); id. at 282–83 (declaration of Ferrari Bravo,
J.); id. at 287, 291 (separate opinion of Guillaume, J.); id. at 294–97 (separate
opinion of Ranjeva, J.); id. at 309 (separate opinion of Fleischhauer, J.); id. at 311–
28 (dissenting opinion of Schwebel, Vice-Pres.); id. at 345–64 (dissenting opinion
of Oda, J.); id. at 380–89, 392–97, 399–428 (dissenting opinion of Shahbuddeen, J.);
id. at 452–87, 494–96, 513–20, 532–42, 553 (dissenting opinion of Weeramantry, J.);
id. at 556, 558–71, 575–76, 578–79 (dissenting opinion of Koroma, J.); id. at 591
(dissenting opinion of Higgins, J.).
41 Continental Shelf (Libya v. Malta), 1985 I.C.J. 13 (June 3).
42 Id. at 29.
40 All
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boundary’s distance from the relevant coasts as a criterion for shelf
boundary delimitation, the Court stated: “that, apart from
[provisions of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea], the
institution of the exclusive economic zone, with its rule on
entitlement by reason of distance, is shown by the practice of States
to have become a part of customary law . . . .”43 In discussing its
rejection of the proposition that, at least as a first step, a proposed
boundary line should be one on which every point was equally
distance from the coasts of the states in question (an equidistance
line), the court acknowledged that the parties had brought to its
attention over seventy shelf delimitation agreements. It went on to
state, however, that, although state practice on this subject was
important, the agreements, taken together, fell short of proving
that use of an equidistance line or any other method was
mandatory, though they did show that such a method could yield
an equitable result in many circumstances.44
State practice, albeit unspecified, was one of several sources on
which the Court relied in other portions of the opinion: that
rejecting Libya’s assertion that the size of a state’s landmass was
relevant to shelf delimitation,45 that disagreeing with the argument
that the ratio of the lengths of the coastlines of the relevant states
should determine the proportion of the shelf each would receive,46
and in holding that, if an equidistance line is used as the first stage
of the exercise, it could subsequently be modified.47
Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo
v. Belgium) (DRC v. Belgium) was the other case treating state
practice as one of several possible sources of CIL.48 In that case, the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (“DRC”) alleged that Belgium
had incurred responsibility to the Congo by issuing an
international warrant for the arrest of the then-sitting foreign
minister of the Congo—not present in Belgium at the time—in
respect of grave breaches of international humanitarian law
allegedly committed by the minister on the territory of the

Id. at 33.
Id. at 38.
45 Id. at 40–41.
46 Id. at 45.
47 Id. at 48.
48 Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 3
(Feb. 14) (DRC v. Belgium).
43
44
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Congo.49 After concluding that a sitting foreign minister enjoys full
immunity from criminal prosecution,50 the Court asked if there
were an exception to this rule with respect to accusations of war
crimes or crimes against humanity. It was at this point that state
practice figured in the Court’s analysis. Specifically, the Court
observed that it had considered the “few decisions of national
higher courts,” including two cases cited by the parties decided
respectively by the House of Lords and the Court of Cassation of
France, but not indicating whether it considered other cases as
well. It also stated that it had considered unspecified national
legislation. In addition to its references to these examples of state
practice, the Court cited to the legal instruments creating
international criminal tribunals and decisions of certain of those
tribunals. On the basis of all of these materials, the Court stated
that it found no exception to the rule of immunity before national
courts with respect to sitting foreign ministers.51
Finally, the case putting weight on the absence of state practice
supporting the applicant was Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of
Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo), (Preliminary Objections)
(Diallo Case);52 the case also involved arguments based on
subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.
Guinea brought this case as a matter of diplomatic protection to
seek reparation on behalf of one of its nationals and certain private
corporations of which this national was the sole share-holder but
which were chartered in the DRC.53 Guinea sought to establish
that, as a matter of customary law, a state was permitted to
exercise diplomatic protection on behalf of such corporations,
relying on dictum from an ICJ case, a number of arbitral opinions,
and the fact that many bilateral and multilateral treaties relating to
the protection of foreign investment permit such representation.54
The Court rejected Guinea’s argument, stating that it had
examined “State practice and decisions of international courts and
tribunals” but found no exception to the usual rule that states may

49 Id.

at 9–10.
Id. at 20–22.
51 Id. at 23–24.
52 Preliminary Objections, Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Guinea v. Dem. Rep.
Congo) 46 I.L.M. 712 (Diallo Case).
53 Id. at 716.
54 Id. at 731–32.
50
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exercise diplomatic protection only on behalf of nationals.55 It
went on to observe:
The fact invoked by Guinea that various international
agreements, such as agreements for the promotion and
protection of foreign investments and the Washington
Convention, have established special legal régimes
governing investment protection, or that provisions in this
regard are commonly included in contracts entered into
directly between States and foreign investors, is not
sufficient to show that there has been a change in the
customary rules of diplomatic protection; it could equally
show the contrary. The arbitrations relied on by Guinea are
also special cases, whether based on specific international
agreements between two or more States, including the one
responsible for the allegedly unlawful acts regarding the
companies concerned . . . or based on agreements
concluded directly between a company and the State
allegedly responsible for the prejudice to it ....... 56
The Court in this case applied a fairly rigorous standard to
determine what counted as state practice regarding diplomatic
protection.
2.1.3.

CIL Cases: State Practice Available, but Rule of Decision
Derived from Other Sources

In a number of cases, the Court has determined that a rule of
CIL existed without referring to state practice, even though
practice existed and supported its result. Rather, the Court
asserted that sources other than state practice had given rise to a
rule of law. In some of these cases, some of those other sources
could be characterized as “subsidiary means for the determination
of a rule of law” under Article 38 of the statute,57 while other
sources on which the Court relied do not seem to fall within any of
the categories of Article 38.
The first such case during the period under discussion was
styled Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area

55 Id.
56 Id.

at 732.

57 I.C.J.

Statute, supra note 2, art. 38(1)(d).
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(Canada v. United States of America) (the “Gulf of Maine Case”).58 The
parties had asked the Court to determine “the course of the single
maritime boundary that divides the continental shelf and fisheries
zones of Canada and the United States of America [in the Gulf of
Maine].”59
The Court observed the parties made no argument supporting
the possibility of drawing such a boundary, simply assuming such
a thing was possible, and concluded “there is certainly no rule of
international law to the contrary.”60 In other words, the Court saw
no legal problem presented by the desire of two states to claim
fishing zones extending 200 miles out from their respective
coasts.61 Although the concept of such zones was relatively new at
the time of the ICJ decision, over 100 states had nonetheless made
claims to economic control over zones 200 miles in breadth, these
claims covered more than 85% of the area potentially subject to
such claims throughout the world.62
However, the Court did not base its conclusion regarding CIL
on this record of practice. Rather, the Court stressed that the Third
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea adopted
provisions establishing rules regarding the continental shelf and
the exclusive economic zone without objection by any of the many
states participating in that conference, that the United States had
proclaimed an exclusive economic zone, and that Canada had
indicated agreement with the concept. It proceeded in this fashion,
moreover, even as it acknowledged that the treaty adopted by the
Conference—the United Nations Convention on the Law of the

58 Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Can. v.
U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 246 (Oct. 12) (Gulf of Maine Case).
59 Id. at 261.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 277–78, 302 (discussing the claims of the United States and Canada
over the delimitation of maritime boundaries).
62 See generally ROBERT W. SMITH, EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE CLAIMS (1986)
(introducing various maritime claims made by different countries); see also Sea
Around Us Project, Web Products: Countries’ EEZ: Equatorial Guinea,
http://www.seaaroundus.org/eez/summaryInfo.aspx?EEZ=226 (last
visited
Dec. 3, 2009); Sea Around Us Project, Web Products: Countries’ EEZ: Madagascar,
http://www.seaaroundus.org/eez/summaryInfo.aspx?EEZ=450 (last
visited
Dec. 3, 2009). The determination that claims covered more than 85% of the area
potentially subject to claims for economic control throughout the world was made
by subtracting the areas of the claimed zones of Equatorial Guinea and that of
Madagascar from the total given by Smith. See SMITH, supra, at 6.
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Sea63 (“UNCLOS”)—was not yet in force and that a number of
states were not likely to become parties to it.64 In fact, as of the
date of the Court’s judgment, only thirteen states had become
parties to the Convention, which did not attract the sixty
ratifications required to enter it into force65 until 1993.66 It should
be noted, however, that at the time of the Court’s judgment, it was
well known that the United States would not become a party to
UNCLOS.67
A second case that could have but did not rely on state practice
to support some of the CIL rules it applied was Continental Shelf.68
In connection with the parties’ acknowledgment that the case was
controlled by CIL, the Court stated:
It is of course axiomatic that the material of customary
international law is to be looked for primarily in the actual
practice and opinio juris of States, even though multilateral
conventions may have an important role to play in
recording and defining rules deriving from custom, or
indeed in developing them. . . . [I]t cannot be denied that
the 1982 Convention is of major importance, having been
adopted by an overwhelming majority of States; hence it is
clearly the duty of the Court, even independently of the
63 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS].
64 See Gulf of Maine Case, 1984 I.C.J. at 294 (stating that a number of states do
not seem inclined to adopt the Convention adopted at the Law of the Sea
Conference).
65 See UNCLOS, supra note 20, art. 308 (requiring ratification by 60 states
before treaty can enter into force).
66 U. N., Office of Legal Affairs, Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the
Sea, Status of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, of the
Agreement relating to the implementation of part XI of the convention and of the
Agreement for the implementation of the provisions of the Convention relating to
the conservation and management of straddling fish stocks and highly migratory
fish stocks: Table Recapitulating the Status of the Convention and of the related
Agreements, as at 1 October, 2009, http://www.un.org/Depts/los/reference
_files/status2008.pdf (last visited Nov. 6, 2009). [hereinafter UNCLOS Status
Table].
67 See U.S. Votes Against Law of the Sea Treaty, 82 DEP’T ST. BULL. 71, 71 (1982)
(quoting U.S. President Ronald Reagan) (declining ratification because the
convention fails to address the United States objection to the deep seabed mining
regime the convention adopts).
68 See generally Continental Shelf Case (Libya v. Malta), 1985 I.C.J. 3 (June 3)
(applying customary international law without relying extensively on state
practice for support).
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references made to the Convention by the Parties, to
consider in what degree any of its relevant provisions are
binding upon the Parties as a rule of customary
international law.69
The Court also expressly stated that it was relying on the work
of the Conference on the Law of the Sea, which produced the 1982
Convention. Thus, the Court cited the work of the Conference to
support the conclusion that the “institution of the exclusive
economic zone” had passed into CIL. It did not, however, refer to
the fact of the proclamation of exclusive economic zones by a great
many states.70 Rejecting Libya’s assertion that the size of a state’s
landmass was relevant to shelf delimitation, the Court asserted a
lack of support “in the work of the Third United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea.”71 Similarly, the Court cited
states’ expression of their views at the Conference on the Law of
the Sea, specifically the argument that the ratio of the lengths of the
coastlines of the relevant states should determine the proportion of
the shelf each would receive.72 In rejecting the argument that an
equidistance line used as the first stage of delimitation cannot be
modified, the Court relied on the Convention on the Continental
Shelf,73 and on the drafting history of UNCLOS.74
It is important to understand that only 19 states had ratified
UNCLOS as of the date of the Court’s judgment.75 The Court’s
statement that the convention was “adopted” by the overwhelming
majority of states thus makes sense only if the Court is referring to
the approval of the Convention text by the states participating in
the Law of the Sea Conference—it cannot be referring to states’
acceptance of the Convention as a binding treaty. Given the low
level of formal acceptance of UNCLOS at this time, the Court’s

69 Id.

at 29–30 (italics in original).
at 33.
71 Id. at 40–41.
72 See id. at 45 (discussing Libya’s contention that proportionality should
determine delimitation).
73 See generally Convention on the Continental Shelf, Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T.
471, 499 U.N.T.S. 311 (discussing delimitation of the continental shelf between
states with shared boundaries).
74 See Continental Shelf Case, 1985 I.C.J. at 48 (citing the work of the
Conference on the Law of the Sea to support its proposition).
75 UNCLOS Status Table, supra note 66.
70 Id.
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reliance on it and on the conference that produced it is somewhat
surprising.
In another delimitation dispute, Maritime Delimitation in the
Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen (Denmark v. Norway),76 the
Court again refrained from relying on available state practice. In
this case, the Court was asked to delimit the continental shelves
and fishery zones of the Danish island of Greenland and the small
Norwegian island of Jan Mayen, about 250 nautical miles to the
east of Greenland.77 The Court concluded that CIL would control
the delimitation of the fishery zone.78 However, in determining the
applicable rule of CIL, the Court made no reference to the
numerous state proclamations of exclusive economic zones.
Instead, the Court cited the award of an arbitral tribunal made in
1977 and its own decision in the Continental Shelf Case to support its
conclusion that the same principles governed both the shelf and
the fishery zone delimitation. The Court also asserted that the
provisions of UNCLOS relating to the delimitation of the
continental shelf and the exclusive economic zone reflected the CIL
on the subject but did not explain this conclusion even though it
noted that UNCLOS had not yet come into force.79 The Court’s
subsequent references to the content of customary law in this case
relied on judicial decisions, the language of treaties, and the work
of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea.80
In Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia),81 the Court
again failed to cite available practice to support a conclusion
regarding the content of CIL. The case arose from a dispute over a
1977 treaty between Hungary and Czechoslovakia under which the
parties had agreed to jointly construct a system of locks on the
1989,
Danube, which formed their boundary.82 In October
Hungary abandoned the project; it purported to terminate the
treaty in May 1992. In April 1993, Hungary and Slovakia—as
76 See generally Maritime Delimitation in the Area between Greenland and Jan
Mayen (Den. v. Nor.) (Denmark v. Norway), 1993 I.C.J. 38 (June 14) (relying on
customary international law to settle dispute over delimitation).
77 Id. at 42–44.
78 Id. at 56–58.
79 Id. at 59.
80 Id. at 60–62.
81 Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7 (Sept. 25).
82 Id. at 17–18 (setting out the nature of the dispute before the court and the
matters provided for in the treaty).
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successor to Czechoslovakia—entered into an agreement to bring
before the Court Slovakia’s claim that Hungary had breached the
1977 treaty.83
One of the issues in this case was whether Slovakia succeeded
to Czechoslovakia’s rights under the treaty. To resolve this point,
the Court simply quoted the International Law Commission (ILC)
to the effect that both traditional doctrine and modern opinion
accept the rule that a succession of states does not affect treaties of
a territorial character.84 The Court made no reference to the ILC’s
careful analysis of state practice supporting this proposition.85
In Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a Special
Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, Advisory Opinion
(Special Rapporteur Advisory Opinion), the Court again characterized
a rule as CIL without reference to supporting practice.86 The
General Assembly sought this advisory opinion to assist it in
dealing with a dispute arising out of Malaysia’s treatment of an
individual who, at the relevant time, was serving as a Special
Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights. 87 It was argued
that Malaysia’s actions violated the treaty regulating the privileges
and immunities of U.N. officials. In the course of examining the
events giving rise to the case, the Court had occasion to assert that
“the conduct of any organ of a State must be regarded as an act of
that State.”88 Although it characterized that rule as customary,89
the Court supported this conclusion only by reference to draft

83 Id.

at 18, 25, 27, 31–34.
See id. at 72 (“[T]he International Law Commission identified ‘treaties of a
territorial character’ as having been regarded both in traditional doctrine and in
modern opinion as unaffected by a succession of States.”) (citation omitted).
85 See Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, U.N.
Doc. A/9610/Rev. 1 (1974), reprinted in [1974] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 154, 184–86,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1974/Add.l, available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc
/documentation/english/A_9610.pdf (reviewing state practice and noting that
often a successor state’s willingness to continue the effect of treaties plays a role in
whether or not those treaties remain in effect).
86 Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a Special
Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, Advisory Opinion, 1999 I.C.J.
62 (Apr. 29) [hereinafter Special Rapporteur Advisory Opinion].
87 See id. at 63–64 (reproducing the request from the Economic and Social
Council for the I.C.J. to rule on a disagreement with Malaysia regarding immunity
of Special Rapporteurs).
88 Id. at 87.
89 Id.
84
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articles on state responsibility provisionally adopted by the ILC.90
It made no reference to state practice even though the ILC had
included detailed analysis of state practice in its commentary on
the relevant article.91
2.1.4.

CIL Cases—Judgment Based on Rules of Decision Derived
from Subsidiary Sources

In several cases decided in part on CIL grounds, the Court
purported to derive rules of law wholly or partly from sources
listed in Article 38(1)(d) of its statutes as “subsidiary means for the
determination of rules of law.” Included in this group are cases
decided by the Court on the basis of rules it derived by analogy to
established rules of international law.
Cases relying primarily on subsidiary sources include Land,
Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador v. Honduras;
Nicaragua intervening), a case involving disputes between El
Salvador and Honduras over several portions of their land
boundary and over their conflicting claims as to sovereignty over
certain islands in the Gulf of Fonseca.92 The Court was also asked
to determine the parties “legal situation” vis-à-vis both the Gulf
itself and waters outside the Gulf.93
In resolving this case, the Court relied on certain black letter
principles of international law,94 and on its own exegesis of these
principles and those of other international tribunals and
commentators.95 Indeed, at one point in the opinion it expressly

90 Id.

91 See Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, U.N.
Doc. A/9010/ Rev. 1 (1974), reprinted in [1973] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 161, 195,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1974/Add.l, available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc
/documentation/english/A_9010.pdf (referencing state practice in support of the
claim that acts of a judicial branch could be viewed as attributable to the state).
92 Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Sal. v. Hond.; Nicar.
intervening), 1992 I.C.J. 350 (Sept. 11).
93 Id. at 380.
94 See id. at 386–87 (uti posseditis juris); id. at 546–49 (avulsion); id. at 586 (rule
that treaty parties’ practice may be used to interpret treaty; concept of historic
bays).
95 See, e.g., id. at 387–401 (Arbitral Award of the Swiss Federal Council,
International Court of Justice); id. at 563–65 (Arbitration of the Island of Palmas,
Permanent Court of International Justice, International Court of Justice); id. at 589–
93 (International Court of Justice, Central American Court of Justice); id. at 597
(Central American Court of Justice); id. at 600–01 (Central American Court of
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characterized its approach as one of relying on “subsidiary means
for the determination of rules of law.”96 It cited no other type of
authority even as it purported to apply CIL.97
In Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. Chad),98 the
Court was asked to determine the land boundary between Libya
and Chad.99 In part, it based its judgment on international judicial
decisions, including its own.100 Although the Court characterized
as CIL a number of the other legal rules it applied in this case, it
did not ground any of them in state practice.
In Hungary v. Slovakia,101 the Court supported the conclusion
that some of the rules the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties102 (Treaties Convention) stated customary international
law solely by reference to its own opinions.103 Also, in considering
the scope of riparian states’ rights to use international rivers, it
cited a decision by the PCIJ.104
In Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswana v. Namibia),105 the Court was
faced with a territorial dispute which the parties agreed was
controlled by a nineteenth century treaty between Great Britain
and Germany, then the colonial powers controlling the areas in
dispute.106 The Court relied only upon its own jurisprudence in
asserting the CIL status of Article 31 of the Treaties Convention,107
including the language of that provision requiring reliance on
Justice, International Court of Justice); id. at 607–09 (Central American Court of
Justice, International Court of Justice).
96 Id. at 601.
97 See id. at 586 (stating that customary international law allows for the
consideration of subsequent state practice in interpreting treaty terms).
98 Territorial Dispute (Libya v. Chad), 1994 I.C.J. 6 (Feb. 3).
99 Id. at 14.
100 See, e.g., id. at 23 (International Court of Justice); id. at 25 (Permanent Court
of International Justice, International Court of Justice); id. at 35 (treaties and
charters of international bodies) (outlining Libya and Chad’s respective requests
for clarification of their boundaries).
101 Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7 (Sept. 25).
102 Treaties Convention, supra note 16.
103 See Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project, 1997 I.C.J. at 38 (“[The court] needs only
to be mindful of the fact that it has several times had occasion to hold that some of
the rules laid down in that Convention might be considered as a codification of
existing customary law.”).
104 Id. at 56.
105 Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Bots. v. Namib.), 1999 I.C.J. 1045 (Dec. 13).
106 Id. at 1049.
107 Treaties Convention, supra note 16, art. 31.
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subsequent practice of treaty parties as an aspect of treaty
interpretation.108 The Court relied on statements by writers and
determinations of arbitral tribunals to define a relevant term.109 It
also relied on treaty practice in general to address several issues in
the case.110 The one treaty on which it specifically relied was cited
to explain the Court’s method of determining the proper measure
of the width of a river; in this connection, the Court also cited a
decision by the United States Supreme Court, and two arbitral
awards.111
Again, in the case concerning the Maritime Delimitation and
Territorial Questions Between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahrain),112
the Court relied on a PCIJ decision for the proposition that
Bahrain’s limited activities on a disputed island were adequate to
permit it to assert sovereignty,113 applying that rule to resolve what
it had described as an issue of CIL.114 It relied on its own cases in
holding that the disputed island was so insignificant that it should
not be given full effect with respect to the determination of the
boundary between the parties’ territorial seas.115 It also derived
from its decisions the principles it applied to delimit a single
boundary between the parties’ continental shelves and exclusive
economic zones,116 and reasoned by analogy to established
principles of maritime law to resolve the question of the effect of a
low-tide elevation on a maritime delimitation.117
108 See Kasikili/Sedudu Island, 1999 I.C.J. at 1059 (noting that the parties agreed
to the application of Article 31 “inasmuch as it reflects customary international
law”); id. at 1075 (detailing the applicability of “subsequent practice” by the
parties involved upon treaty interpretation under Article 31).
109 See id. at 1064 (pointing towards the treatment of the term “main channel”
in scientific reports and arbitral decisions as potentially influential in defining the
term).
110 See, e.g., id. at 1061–62 (noting that “various definitions of the term
‘thalweg’ are found in treaties delimiting boundaries and that the concepts of the
thalweg of a watercourse and the centre of a watercourse are not equivalent.”).
111 Id. at 1066.
112 Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions Between Qatar and
Bahrain, (Qatar v. Bahrain), 2001 I.C.J. 40 (Mar. 16).
113 See id. at 100 (noting that in the past “the tribunal has been satisfied with
very little in the way of the actual exercise of sovereign rights”).
114 Id. at 91.
115 See id. at 104, 109 (noting the small size of the island in question and
referencing past decisions discussing situations where such land might have a
“disproportionate effect” with respect to its size on national boundaries).
116 See id. at 110–15 (describing this analysis).
117 Id. at 102–03.
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Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (Indonesia v.
Malaysia)118 was a dispute over two small islands in the Celebes
Sea. In addressing a relevant treaty, the Court once again repeated
its ascription of CIL status to the rule that requires the Court to
take account of treaty parties’ practice when interpreting a treaty,
relying solely on its own decisions.119 It also relied on its own
decisions when, after concluding that a particular treaty did not
apply to the islands in question, it enunciated the rules of law to be
applied to the parties’ arguments based on their respective
activities relative to the islands.120
In yet another boundary case, Land and Maritime Boundary
between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria; Equatorial Guinea
Intervening),121 the Court relied solely on its own decisions to
determine a relevant legal standard.122 The Court supported its
conclusion that Great Britain, during the time it claimed
sovereignty over Nigeria as a colonial power, possessed the
authority to conclude a treaty relevant to another issue by a very
general reference to the practice of European powers regarding
their African colonies, and by citations to an arbitral award and to
two of its own decisions. The Court put forward no specific
examples of state practice in this connection.123 Meanwhile, the
Court resolved other issues in the case by relying on the practice of
the parties and on the effect of certain actions taken by the United
Nations during the period that the area in dispute was a Trust
Territory; it decided still others by reference to arbitral awards and
to certain of its own decisions.124
In addition to the foregoing, and as noted above,125 the Court in
the Arrest Warrant Case126 relied in part on the legal instruments
118 Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (Indon. v. Malay.),
2002 I.C.J. 625 (Dec. 17).
119 Id. at 645–46.
120 Id. at 668, 678, 682.
121 Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon
v. Nig.), 2002 I.C.J. 303 (Oct. 10).
122 Id. at 352–55, 401–16.
123 Id. at 404–07.
124 Id. at 407–16.
125 See supra text accompanying notes 48–51 (discussing the details of Dem.
Rep. Conogo v. Belgium, a case treating state practice as one of several possible
sources of CIL).
126 Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 3
(Feb. 14) (DRC v. Belgium).
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creating international criminal tribunals and to decisions of certain
of those tribunals.127 As also discussed above,128 in the Diallo
Case,129 the Court relied on draft articles produced by the
International Law Commission and certain excerpts from its own
decisions to define the concept of diplomatic protection, to
establish the claimant state’s obligation to establish either that such
local remedies that were available were exhausted or that
exceptional circumstances prevented exhaustion, and for
proposition that it was for the respondent state to show that there
were local remedies available but not exhausted.130
2.1.5.

CIL Cases - Authority for the Court’s Judgment Either Not
Apparent or Doubtful

In five cases decided during this period, the Court either cited
no basis for its assertions as to the content of CIL or relied solely on
sources of law of questionable authority.
The first such case was Military and Paramilitary Activities in and
against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits131
(Nicaragua). Among the state practice issues that this case
presented was one involving the concept of state practice itself. In
its discussion of the nature of state practice sufficient to establish
and maintain a rule of CIL, the Court stated:
The Court does not consider that, for a rule to be
established as customary, the corresponding practice must
be in absolutely rigorous conformity with the rule. . . . If a
State acts in a way prima facie incompatible with a
recognized rule, but defends its conduct by appealing to
exceptions or justifications contained within the rule itself,
then whether or not the State’s conduct is in fact justifiable

127 Id.

at 23–24.
See supra text accompanying notes 52–56 (discussing the details of the
standard applied in the Diallo Case to determine what counted as state practice
regarding diplomatic protection).
129 Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Guinea v. Congo), Preliminary Objections, 46
I.L.M. 712.
130 Id. at 728–30.
131 Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June
27).
128
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on that basis, the significance of that attitude is to confirm
rather than to weaken the rule.132
In essence, the Court asserts that contrary practice does not
undermine the existence of a rule of CIL so long as the state
engaging in that practice proffers an explanation grounded in the
rule, even, apparently, if that explanation is made in bad faith.
Nothing in the Court’s opinion qualifies this assertion even for
cases in which the bad faith of the acting state is patent. The Court
cites no authority of any sort to support this statement of the law.
A second state practice issue in the case was identifying the
content of the relevant rule of CIL. In a confusing passage, the
Court noted the parties’ agreement on the CIL status of the U.N.
Charter’s restrictions on the use of force, but nonetheless saw itself
as obliged to verify the existence of opinio juris consistent with this
position. It purported to find the necessary evidence in the
General Assembly’s adoption of its Declaration on Principles of
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and CoOperation Among States133 between states, asserting:
The effect of consent to the text of such resolutions cannot
be understood as merely that of a “reiteration or
elucidation” of the treaty commitment undertaken in the
Charter. On the contrary, it may be understood as an
acceptance of the validity of the rule or set of rules declared
by the resolution by themselves.134
The Court did not explain why consent to the resolution must
be understood as it asserts; it merely made the assertion. Similarly
unexplained was the Court’s conclusion that the United States
itself had demonstrated opinio juris with respect to this CIL
principle by its acceptance of two non-binding resolutions at
international conferences and by ratifying a regional treaty.135
This case also required the Court to determine the legal
responsibility of the United States for the acts of the contra
132 Id.

at 98.
Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly
Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), U.N. Doc. A/8082 (Oct. 24, 1970)
[hereinafter Declaration on Friendly Relations].
134 Military and Paramilitary Activities, 1986 I.C.J. at 100.
135 Id.
133
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guerrillas directed against Nicaragua.136 The Court resolved the
issue as follows:
The Court has taken the view . . . that United States
participation, even if preponderant or decisive, in the
financing, organizing, training, supplying and equipping of
the contras, the selection of its military or paramilitary
targets, and the planning of the whole of its operation, is
still insufficient in itself . . . for the purpose of attributing to
the United States the acts committed by the contras in the
course of their military or paramilitary operations in
Nicaragua. . . . For this conduct to give rise to legal
responsibility of the United States, it would in principle
have to be proved that that State had effective control of the
military or paramilitary operations in the course of which
the alleged violations were committed.137
The Court cited no authority for this standard.
The Nicaragua Court relied on other supposed CIL rules, the
sources of which it did not explain, in addressing the United
States’s argument that, even if its behavior was otherwise
unlawful, it was in any event justified as an exercise of collective
self-defense with respect to actions taken by Nicaragua affecting
other Central American states, particularly El Salvador.138 The
Court acknowledged that the right of self-defense was a matter of
customary law, citing the U.N. Charter and certain General
Assembly declarations in support but making no reference to state
practice.139 The Court therefore had to address the content of the
customary law of self-defense. It noted that the United States’
argument that it had engaged in lawful self-defense depended on
the assertion by the United States that Nicaragua had perpetrated
an armed attack on El Salvador; the Court, however, stressed that
the actions of Nicaragua were said to have involved “provision of
weapons or logistical or other support”140 and asserted that such
actions, though they could amount to a threat of force or an
intervention, could not be considered armed attacks triggering the
136
137
138
139
140

Id. at 53–65.
Id. at 64–65.
Id. at 72.
Id. at 102–03.
Id. at 103–04.
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right of the victim of the attack to respond in self-defense.141 The
Court did not explain the basis for this distinction.
The Court also stated that the right of a state to engage in
collective self-defense on behalf of a second state depended on a
request for such aid from the first state to the second, citing in
reliance two inter-American treaties, and asserting that, apart from
inter-American law, general international law imposed a similar
requirement.142 Again, it provided no examples of state practice to
demonstrate the existence of this requirement.
The Nuclear Weapons Case provides an example of reliance on
sources whose law-making character is doubtful. In asserting that
“States must take environmental considerations into account when
assessing what is necessary and proportionate in the pursuit of
legitimate military objectives,”143 the Court relied on a non-binding
declaration made at a United Nations Conference, a General
Assembly resolution, and an order the Court had made in an
earlier case.144 It also relied on Articles 35(3) and 55 of the First
Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of 1949,145
forbidding the use of methods of warfare intended to or which
may be expected to cause very severe, long-term environmental
damage and requiring war-making states to protect against such
damage;146 however, the CIL status of these articles at the time of
the Court’s decision is unclear.147 If those articles were not CIL at

141 Id.

at 104.
at 104–05.
143 Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 242
(July 8) (Nuclear Weapons Case).
144 Id. at 242–43.
145 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I)
art. 35(3), art. 55, June 8, 1977, U.N.T.S. 17512.
146 Nuclear Weapons Case, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 242 (July 8).
147 Since there were 147 parties to the First Additional Protocol at the time of
the Court’s decision, one could argue that the number of ratifications alone would
amount to sufficient state practice to establish a rule of CIL. See Table of
Ratifications of Accessions to Protocol I, available at http://www.cicr.org/ihl.nsf
/WebSign?ReadForm&id=470&ps=P (last visited Dec. 3, 2009). However, about
one in five UN members were not parties to the Protocol at that time, including
France, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States, which casts some doubt
on that conclusion. See United Nations, Member States of the United Nations,
available at http://www.un.org/members/list.shtml (last visited Dec. 3, 2009).
This doubt is reinforced by Professor Greenwood’s questioning of the CIL status
of the articles at issue, albeit in an article predating the Court’s decision,
142 Id.
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the time of the Court’s decision, the Court’s conclusion regarding
states’ environmental duties in war time was thus based solely on
reliance on non-binding instruments and on a treaty which did not
codify CIL.
DRC v. Belgium148 also involved reliance on doubtful sources to
determine the content of CIL. The Court saw this case as turning
on the immunities international law afforded sitting foreign
ministers from the jurisdiction of the courts of states other than
their own. It acknowledged that the issue was a matter of CIL,
though it cited treaties addressing closely related issues as
providing “useful guidance.”149 In its examination of CIL, the
Court referred solely to functional considerations; it made no
reference to state practice. Based on such considerations—and,
presumably, by analogy to the treaties it had cited—the Court
concluded that a sitting foreign minister enjoys both full immunity
from criminal jurisdiction and personal inviolability.150 The Court
closed its judgment by listing various sets of circumstances in
which sitting foreign ministers could be prosecuted for war crimes
and crimes against humanity. Only two involved international
law. Again, the Court offered no authority supporting its
conclusion with regard to them, though the rules it announced
were analogous to those in the treaties it had previously cited.
In Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project151 the Court rested its discussion
of riparian states’ CIL rights to the use of international
watercourses in part on the adoption of the Convention on the Law
of Non-Navigable Uses of International Watercourses152 by the
General Assembly,153 even though that Convention has never come
into force.154

Christopher Greenwood, Customary Law Status of the 1977 Geneva Protocols, in
ESSAYS ON WAR IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 179, 190, 195 (2006).
148 Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.) (DRC v.
Belgium), 2002 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 14).
149 Id. at 21.
150 Id. at 20–22.
151 Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7 (Sept. 25).
152 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of
International Watercourses, G.A. Res. 51/229, Annex, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess.,
Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/51/49 (May 21, 1997).
153 Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project, 1997 I.C.J. at 55–56.
154 INTERNATIONAL WATER LAW PROJECT, STATUS OF THE WATERCOURSE
CONVENTION (2008).
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Another unsourced judgment was Oil Platforms.155 In this case,
Iran sought reparation for damage the United States had inflicted
on three Iranian oil-drilling platforms in October, 1987, and April,
1988.156 The Court’s jurisdiction was based on a 1955 Treaty of
Amity between the United States and Iran providing that any
disputes regarding “the interpretation or application” of the treaty
were to be heard by the I.C.J.157 Iran alleged that the attacks on the
platforms breached the treaty. The United States denied that the
treaty had been breached, but also asserted that, in any event, the
actions taken by the United States were permitted by an article of
the treaty providing that the treaty “did not preclude the
application of measures . . . necessary . . . to protect [a party’s]
essential security interests.”
The context of the actions at issue in this case was the Iran-Iraq
war of 1980–88. During that period, there were a considerable
number of attacks on neutral shipping plying the Persian/Arabian
Gulf. On October 16, 1987, an American-flag vessel was struck by
a missile while in the vicinity of Kuwait Harbor. The United States
attributed the attack to Iran and, claiming self-defense, attacked
two oil platforms on October 19. On April 14, 1988, an American
warship struck a mine in international waters near Bahrain. The
United States again blamed Iran and reacted by attacking Iranian
installations, including a third oil platform, on April 20, again
claiming self-defense.158
The Court stated that it would evaluate the self-defense claim
by the United States “by reference to international law applicable
to this question, that is to say, the provisions of the Charter of the
United Nations and customary international law.”159 With respect
to each American use of force, the Court asked, first, whether the
United States had proven that Iran had previously launched an
attack, second, whether the attack could be considered an “armed
attack” on the United States, and finally, whether the American
155 Case Concerning Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.) (Oil Platforms), 2003 I.C.J. 161
(Nov. 6).
156 Id. at 166, 169–70.
157 Id. at 178.
158 Id. at 174–76.
159 Id. at 183. Oddly, instead of first determining whether the actions of the
United States breached the treaty, and then inquiring whether those measures
were necessary to protect essential security interests—that is, first considering the
claim, then turning to the affirmative defense—the Court elected to consider the
defense first.
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responses could be said to satisfy tests of necessity and
proportionality.160 The Court concluded that the United States had
failed to meet the burden of proving Iranian responsibility for
either the October 16 or the April 14 attack.161 It also held that the
actions of which the United States complained could not be labeled
“armed attacks.” With respect to the first incident, the Court noted
that the United States characterized the missile strike on the tanker
in Kuwait waters as part of a series of attacks to which the United
States was responding. It held that these events, even taken
together, did not amount to an armed attack on the United States,
since the United States had not proven that the actions were
specifically directed at United States targets (as opposed to being
directed at an area where American-flag ships, among others, were
known to operate).
Further, the Court seemed to doubt that these actions were
sufficiently grave to amount to armed attacks.162 The court
likewise held that the mining of the American warship did not
constitute an armed attack to which the attacks on the oil platforms
could be seen as a defensive response. Indeed, its language
implied that an attack on a state’s warship was not necessarily an
armed attack on the state.163 The Court also held that neither
American response met the necessity standard, observing that the
United States had not complained to Iran of the use of the oil
platforms, in contrast to the complaints the United States was
acknowledged to have made regarding mining activity.164 Finally,
the Court concluded that the October 19 attack might meet the
proportionality standard, but held that the April 20 attack did not,
holding that the damage done in the attack had to be in proportion
to that suffered by the United States in the mining of the warship,
as opposed to some other measure of proportionality.165
The legal standard the Court applied therefore can be summed
up as (1) a state cannot be the victim of an armed attack unless the
action of which it complains is directed specifically at it, as
160 Id.

at 189, 191–92, 195–96.
Id. at 189–90. The Court’s analysis of the facts of this case was criticized
by Judges Higgins, id. at 233–35 (separate opinion of Judge Higgins) and
Buergenthal, id. at 286–88 (separate opinion of Judge Buergenthal).
162 Id. at 191–92.
163 Id. at 195–96.
164 Id. at 193–94, 198.
165 Id. at 198–99.
161
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opposed to being an indiscriminate attack that the attacker must
have known could affect the state attacked; (2) an action, even by a
state’s military, is not an armed attack unless it rises to a sufficient
level of gravity, even if the target is itself a military unit; (3)
satisfying the necessity requirement of the doctrine of self-defense
demands some sort of complaint by the defending state to the
attacking state, even if there is good reason to doubt that the
complaint would have any effect; and (4) the proportionality of an
action taken in self-defense is evaluated by a comparison to the
action to which it was a response, not by comparing it to the
danger the defending state seeks to avoid. These conclusions have
been criticized as misstating the law.166 For present purposes, what
is important is that the Court made no reference to any state
practice in reading the foregoing limitations into what it
apparently considered the CIL rules regarding self-defense,
indeed, it did not make clear the source of those limitations.
The Wall Case167 was another in which many of the Court’s
conclusions were based on doubtful sources. That case addressed
Israel’s construction of a barrier (the wall) intended to block
infiltration by terrorists across Israel’s de facto 1967 eastern border
(the Green Line) from the occupied Palestinian territories.168 The
Court stated in the opinion that
[T]he rules and principles of international law which are
relevant in assessing the legality of the measures taken by Israel . . .
can be found in the United Nations Charter and certain other
treaties, in customary international law and in the relevant
resolutions adopted pursuant to the Charter by the General
Assembly and the Security Council.169
Since General Assembly Resolutions are not legally binding,
this statement makes explicit that the Court was relying on sources
hard to reconcile with Article 38. The Court grounded its assertion
that international law renders illegal any acquisition of territory by
force on the Charter, a General Assembly resolution, and language
from Nicaragua, Merits.170 To support the statement that the right
166 See, e.g., Taft, supra note 10, at 299–306 (analyzing the elements of selfdefense in international law).
167 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in Occupied Palestinian
Territory, Advisory Opinion (Wall Case), 2004 I.C.J. 136 (July 9).
168 Id. at 166–70.
169 Id. at 171.
170 Id.
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to self-determination is a right erga omnes, relied on Articles 1 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights171 and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,172
the Charter, a second General Assembly resolution, and three of its
decisions.173 It relied on a judgment of the Nuremberg tribunal
and one of its decisions in holding that the Hague Regulations of
1907174 had passed into customary international law.175 To support
its conclusion that the Fourth Geneva Convention176 applied in the
Palestinian territories, the Court once again cited its own cases for
the proposition that Article 31 of the Treaties Convention had
passed into customary international law, and on the travaux
préparatoires of the Fourth Geneva Convention, a resolution of a
meeting of the parties to that convention, a statement by the
International Committee of the Red Cross (“ICRC”), various
General Assembly and Security Resolutions, and a decision of the
Supreme Court of Israel.177 (Oddly, the Court justified its reliance
on the ICRC’s interpretation of the Fourth Convention by reference
to language in Article 142 of that treaty which provides, “[t]he
special position of the International Committee of the Red Cross in
this field shall be recognized and respected at all times.”178 That
article, however, refers only to access by relief societies to
protected persons; it does not address the ICRC’s competence to
interpret the Convention.)179 The court relied on the practice of the
Human Rights Committee (the monitoring body established by the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights) and on the
travaux préparatoires of that instrument in holding that the

171 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 1, Dec. 16, 1966,
999 U.N.T.S. 171.
172 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 1,
Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3.
173 Wall Case, 2004 I.C.J. at 171–72.
174 Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct.
18, 1907, T.S. 539, 1 Bevans 631.
175 Wall Case, 2004 I.C.J. at 172.
176 Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War, Aug. 12, 1949, T.I.A.S. 3365, 6 U.S.T. 3516 (hereinafter Fourth Geneva
Convention).
177 Wall Case, 2004 I.C.J. at 171–77.
178 Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 176, art. 142.
179 Id.
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provisions of the Covenant apply in territory under the control of a
party to the Covenant as a matter of belligerent occupation.180
Finally, the Court considered the possibility that Israel had
available the defense of necessity; that proposition, too, was
rejected. The Court, relying on its own decision which citied a
draft by the International Law Commission, asserted that a state
may not rely on a plea of necessity unless the action taken is “the
only way for the State to safeguard an essential interest against a
grave and imminent peril.”181 The Court maintained that it was,
“not convinced that the construction of the wall along the route
chosen was the only means to safeguard the interests of Israel
against the peril which it has invoked as justification for that
construction.”182
Several of the rules the Court labeled CIL in this case183 do not
seem to satisfy the state practice requirement in Article 38 of the
I.C.J. Statute. Indeed, at no point in its opinion did it make any
reference to actual state practice other than in its citation to the
Israeli Supreme Court’s opinion in connection with the
applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention. It did, however,
cite repeatedly to General Assembly resolutions, determinations by
the Human Rights Committee and the International Law
Commission, and once to a determination by the ICRC.184 While
some of these bodies might count as subsidiary sources of law, no
legal instrument grants any of them the authority to make rules
binding in international law. The Court did not address the fact
that one of these bodies—the International Law Commission—has
expressed doubts about the competence of bodies such as the
Human Rights Committee to definitively interpret the treaties they
monitor, at least in the context of evaluating treaty reservations.185

180 Wall

Case, 2004 I.C.J. at 177–80.
at 194–95.
182 Id. at 195. Though not really relevant to this discussion, it is impossible
not to note that the discussion of the necessarily fact-specific issue of Israel’s
necessity argument is surprisingly brief and conclusory.
183 Id. at 171–73.
184 Id. at 171–79.
185 Int’l Law Comm’n, Rapport de la Commission du droit international, sur les
travaux de sa quarante-neuvième session, 12 mai–18 juillet 1997 [Report of the
International Law Commission on the Work of Its Forty-ninth Session, 12 May–18 July
1997], 107, U.N. Doc. A/52/10 (1997).
181 Id.
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Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic
of the Congo v. Uganda)186 (DRC v. Uganda) also raises issues of the
Court’s reliance on sources not mentioned in Article 38. The
Democratic Republic of the Congo (“DRC”) sought relief from the
presence of Ugandan troops in its territory after August 1998,
when the DRC had allegedly ceased to consent to what had
admittedly begun as a consensual presence. The DRC further
alleged various human rights violations and other war crimes
committed by Ugandan forces. Uganda claimed that, in the period
between 1994 and 1997, the DRC was supporting anti-Uganda
rebel groups based in the territory of the DRC and carrying out
attacks in Ugandan territory, and that DRC support for such
groups resumed in 1998. Uganda therefore asserted that its
operations in the territory of the Congo were matters of lawful selfdefense. Uganda also counter-claimed against the DRC, asserting
that the DRC had violated its duty of vigilance by tolerating the
operations of anti-Ugandan armed groups on Congolese
territory.187
The Court held that a state’s obligations under human rights
treaties apply to territory over which it acquired control during the
course of an armed conflict. The Court relied solely on its own
decision in the Wall case188 to support this proposition, not even
considering the language of the human rights treaties that it
deemed applicable.189
The Court also gave a doubtfully sourced response to the
DRC’s assertion that Uganda’s alleged pillaging of the Congo’s
natural resources was a violation of the principle that a state enjoys
permanent sovereignty over its natural resources. The Court
agreed that this principle was a matter of customary international
law, but relied solely on several General Assembly resolutions as
support for that conclusion,190 despite the lack of binding legal
effect in General Assembly resolutions.

186 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v.
Uganda), Dec. 19, 2005, 45 I.L.M. 271, 280–284 (2006).
187 Id. at 329.
188 Id. at 317, para. 216 (citing Legal Consequences of the Construction of a
Wall in Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 178–81
(July 9)).
189 Id. at 317–18.
190 Id. at 322–23.
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Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and
Montenegro), Merits191 (Genocide Case) was another case in which the
Court chose to rely on its own decisions as authority even in the
face of counter-arguments. Bosnia and Herzegovina originally
brought this case in 1993, alleging that the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (“FRY”), which became Serbia and Montenegro, was
responsible for committing genocide in Bosnia and Herzegovina.192
The CIL issue arose when the Court had to determine the standard
to evaluate the degree of control Serbia and Montenegro exercised
over groups found to have perpetrated genocide. Thereafter, the
court could determine whether the genocide could be attributed to
Serbia and Montenegro.193 In Nicaragua, the Court held that the
acts of groups could be attributed to a state only if it exercised
“effective control” of the groups, that is, if it “directed or enforced
the perpetration” of the particular acts at issue.194 However, as the
ICJ noted, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) applied a different standard in Prosecutor v.
Tadić.195
In Tadić, the standard for evaluating the defendant’s conduct
depended on the applicability of a particular treaty, which only
applied if the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina could be considered
“international.” Classifying the conflict as international depended
on whether the acts of Bosnian-Serb military forces could be
attributed to the FRY (as it then was). The ICTY acknowledged
that the Court’s “effective control” test had not been satisfied. It
held, however, that the effective control test was not the proper
legal standard for evaluating the connection between a
government and a military unit not part of the state structure,
holding instead the conduct of the unit could be attributed to the
state so long as the state was in “overall control” of the unit—that
is, so long as the state provided financing, equipment, and

191 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.), Feb. 26, 2007, 46 I.L.M. 188,
288 (2007) (Genocide Case).
192 Id. at 190.
193 Id. at 286–87.
194 Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 64–65
(June 27).
195 Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment in the Appeals
Chamber, ¶ 112 (July 15, 1999).
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participated in the planning and supervision of military
operations.196 Most important was the mode of analysis employed
by the ICTY. It first considered the logic of the concept of
attribution, noting that states were responsible for even ultra vires
conduct of their organs, and observing that, for attribution
purposes, an organized, hierarchically structured group could be
analogized more reasonably to a state organ than to an individual,
for whom a more demanding attribution standard might be
appropriate.197 The ICTY next examined in detail decisions by
three international tribunals and one from the German courts (such
a decision being a form of German state practice) which attributed
state acts of hierarchically structured groups to the “overall
control” standard.198
In addressing the difference between its standard and that of
the ICTY, the Court took note of the formulation on State
Responsibility in the International Law Commission’s Articles to
the effect that the acts of persons or groups are attributed to a state
if the person or group is “acting . . . under the direction or control
of” the state. The issue, however, was defining “control.” After
citing this language, the Court rejected the ICTY’s standard
because “it stretch[ed] too far, almost to the breaking point, the
connection which must exist between the conduct of a State’s
organs and its international responsibility.”199 The Court did not
explain why it reached this conclusion; it simply asserted it.
Likewise, the Court did not acknowledge that the commentary on
the relevant portion of the Articles on State Responsibility takes
note of both the Nicaragua and Tadić cases, but does not choose
between them.200 Nor did the ICJ engage the arguments made by
the ICTY, including the arguments drawn from judicial decisions
and state practice. We are left, therefore, with nothing more than
ipse dixit to support the ICJ’s result.

Id. ¶ 145.
Id. ¶¶ 119, 121.
198 Id. ¶¶ 124–31.
199 Genocide Case, 46 I.L.M. at 286–88.
200 Int’l Law Comm’n, Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of
Its Fifty-third Session, 23 April–1 June and 2 July–10 August 2001, 103–09, U.N. Doc.
A/56/10 (2001).
196
197
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CIL Cases - Rule Applied Contradicted by Significant State
Practice

In four cases decided during this period, the Court’s judgment
relied on a rule of law contradicted by significant state practice. It
is important to stress that the practice to which the Court appeared
unwilling to give weight was not sporadic or attributable to lowlevel government officials, but frequent and the consequence of
decisions by the highest level of government.
Two of these cases were the decisions involving the United
States and Nicaragua, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and
against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Jurisdiction
and Admissability201 (Nicaragua, Jurisdiction) and Nicaragua, Merits.202
Nicaragua alleged in its application that the United States was
responsible for certain unlawful uses of force against it. As noted
above,203 the ICJ’s analysis in these judgments was and remains
quite controversial. Accordingly, they will require some
discussion.
In Nicaragua, Jurisdiction, the Court addressed arguments made
by the United States against the ICJ’s jurisdiction over Nicaragua’s
claims against it. The elements of the Court’s analysis depended
very little on state practice. One exception, however, concerned an
element of the instrument by which the United States had accepted
the court’s so-called compulsory jurisdiction.
In that instrument, the United States excluded from its consent
certain disputes arising under multilateral treaties.204 The United
States argued that, since Nicaragua based its claims in part on the
United Nations Charter, the case fell into the class of excluded
disputes.205 The Court rejected this argument, observing that
Nicaragua had also based its claims on allegations of violations of
customary international law and “[p]rinciples such as those of the
non-use of force, non-intervention, respect for the independence
201 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and
Against
Nicaragua,
Jurisdiction of the Court and Admissibility of the Application (Nicar. v. U.S.),
1984 I.C.J. 392, 421–23 (Nov. 26) (Nicaragua, Jurisdiction).
202 Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 16 (June
27).
203 See supra text accompanying notes 6–10 (citing commentators’ negative
reactions and strong criticism of the court’s decisions in Nicaragua, Merits, the
Wall Case, and Oil Platform).
204 Nicaragua, Jurisdiction, 1984 I.C.J. at 421–23.
205 Id. at 422.
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and territorial integrity of States and the freedom of navigation,
continue to be binding as part of customary international
law . . .”206 While this assertion presumably must be understood to
mean that the Court saw these principles as representing the
general practice of states, it did not explicitly address the question
of whether the state practice in fact conformed to those principles.
Rather, it simply asserted their character as customary law.
This argument was also crucial to the Court’s Judgment in
Nicaragua, Merits,207 aspects of which have already been addressed.
The Court in that case repeated its assertion that Article 2(4) of the
U.N. Charter, forbidding “the threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any state,”208 was a
rule of customary international law.209 But the Court cited no state
practice whatever supporting this conclusion. While the Court
argued that the opinio juris supporting this proposition of law had
to be established and attempted to do so, it did not analyze state
practice. Furthermore, in attempting to establish opinio juris, the
Court relied on a number of doubtful sources.210 These included
the Declaration on Friendly Relations, the support of the United
States for non-binding resolutions adopted by other bodies, the
language of a treaty to which the United States was a party,
frequent statements by state representatives, the work of the ILC,
and statements by both of the parties in their memorials that the
rule was one of jus cogens.211 The Court’s use of statements from
both parties’ memorials is somewhat confusing in light of the
Court’s earlier insistence that it was obliged to determine the law
on this subject independent of the parties’ positions.212 The Court
also relied on the Declaration on Friendly Relations as establishing
the grounds for legal distinctions between uses of force
constituting armed attacks and those which are less serious, and
reinforcing the argument that armed intervention by one state in
the internal affairs of a second state is a violation of a customary
rule213—indeed, its focus on the language of this non-binding
206
207
208
209
210
211
212
213

Id. at 424, para. 73.
Military and Paramilitary Activities, 1986 I.C.J. at 93–94.
U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
Military and Paramilitary Activities, 1986 I.C.J. at 99–100.
Id.
Id. at 100–01.
Id. at 97–98.
Id. at 101–02.
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resolution in this context is hard to distinguish from what would
be expected if the Court were construing a treaty.
By characterizing the foregoing actions as establishing a CIL
rule, the Court effectively attributed no legal effect to states’
interventions in the internal affairs of other states, a type of action
which took place frequently during the 1970’s and 1980’s; one
count showed 18 such interventions.214 The Court acknowledged
this fact, stating that “there have been in recent years a number of
instances of foreign intervention for the benefit of forces opposed
to the government of another state.”215 However, the Court
proffered two reasons for according no legal significance to these
interventions. First, it stated that it “is not concerned here with the
process of decolonization; this question is not at issue in the
present case.”216 The implication, of course, is that there is some
legally relevant distinction between interventions in aid of
decolonization and all others, such that the latter can be considered
without reference to the former. The Court, however, did not
explain the basis of any such distinction.
The Court offered a second reason for disregarding the
interventions to which it referred: the intervening states offered no
legal rationale for their behavior.217 Citing its opinion in North Sea
Continental Shelf,218 the court asserted that practice was not enough
to establish a new rule of customary law. Also required was
“evidence of a belief that this practice is rendered obligatory by the
existence of a rule of law requiring it. The need for such a belief,
i.e., the existence of a subjective element, is implicit in the very
notion of the opinio juris sive necessitatis.”219
In the case of interventions, however, “States had not justified
their conduct by reference to a new right of intervention or to a
new exception to the principle of its prohibition.”220 According to
the Court, the United States, in particular, had justified its actions
214 A. MARK WEISBURD, USE OF FORCE: THE PRACTICE OF STATES SINCE WORLD
WAR II 120–28, 139–41, 143–50, 152–66, 179–82, 184–86, 188–96, 198–202, 203–06,
226–40 (1997).
215 Id. at 108.
216 Id.
217 Id. at 108–10.
218 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (F.R.G. v. Den.; F.R.G. v. Neth.) 1969
I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 20).
219 Id. at 44 (internal citation omitted), quoted in Military and Paramilitary
Activities, 1986 I.C.J. at 109.
220 Military and Paramilitary Activities, 1986 I.C.J. at 109.
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regarding Nicaragua in statements of policy; it had not asserted
new rules of international law.221 Therefore, the Court held that
such interventions and therefore the actions of the United States
toward Nicaragua, were unlawful.222
Since part of the purpose of this Article is to examine the
quality of the ICJ’s decisions, it is important to note several crucial
flaws in its reasoning on this point. In the first place, its approach
assumed the existence of the rule against intervention, and
asserted that the evidence was insufficient to permit the conclusion
that the rule had changed; the more basic question, however, was
whether the rule on which the Court relied had ever come into
existence, in light of contrary state practice, or, if it had, whether it
continued to exist. Second, the Court’s approach did not
distinguish between the evidence required to demonstrate the
existence of a restriction on state freedom—the issue in the North
Sea Case223—and that necessary to show the absence of any such
restriction. Finally, the Court was clearly incorrect in its assertion
that states engaged in interventions in the affairs of other states
had never offered legal justifications for their actions.224
221 Id.

222 Id.

at 109–10, 118–19, 124.
See North Sea Continental Shelf Case, 1969 I.C.J. at 3 (discussing whether
customary international law obliged Germany to accept an equidistance line as
the method of delimiting the boundaries between its continental shelf and those of
its neighbors).
224 France intervened in Gabon in 1964 to suppress a military coup, justifying
its action by reference to a mutual defense treaty between the two states
addressing internal as well as external defense. See WEISBURD, supra note 214, at
219. After the intervention by the United States in the midst of the civil disorder
in the Dominican Republic beginning in April, 1965, Lyndon Johnson, then
President of the United States, strongly endorsed the principle of non-intervention
by states into the internal affairs of other states; however, he defended the
Dominican intervention in part by relying on a 1962 resolution of an organ of the
Organization of American States and also by characterizing interventions aimed
at preventing the establishment of Communist governments in the Western
Hemisphere as an exception to the non-intervention principle. Lyndon B.
Johnson, Statement of President Johnson (May 2, 1965), reprinted in DEP’T. ST.
BULL., May 17, 1965, at 744, 746–47. That is, he did not simply misrepresent the
actions the United States had taken. Again, in November, 1968, after the Warsaw
Pact states had invaded Czechoslovakia the previous August in order to replace
that country’s liberal Communist government, WEISBURD, supra note 214, at 224–
26, Leonid Breznhev, then General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union, defended the invasion in a speech arguing that, notwithstanding the
general rule that interventions in internal affairs were unlawful, international law
as understood by the Soviet Union allowed interventions undertaken to prevent
the weakening of the socialist system. Leonid Brezhnev, General Secretary,
223
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In its two Nicaragua judgments, then, the ICJ was unwilling to
accord state practice the status apparently required by Article 38 in
analyses of CIL, preferring to rely on sources of law not mentioned
in Article 38 and not binding on their own terms.225
The Court also ignored relevant practice in three other cases.
As noted above,226 the Court in the Oil Platforms Case227 applied a
very stringent test for determining whether the United States could
rely on the defenses of self-defense and necessity with respect to its
attacks on Iranian oil platforms. However, the Court did not
inquire whether the response of the United States and the United
Nations to the attacks of September 11, 2001 had any bearing on
the content of the law of self-defense.228 Since Security Council
decisions are legally binding on all U.N. members, Council
resolutions would appear to be a very important type of state
practice. Yet the Court in Oil Platforms did not address Security
Council Resolution 1378,229 which apparently endorses the
overthrow of the Taliban regime as a response to the September 11
Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Speech before the fifth Congress of the
Polish United Workers Party (Nov. 13, 1968).
225 Beyond these points, there is reason to wonder whether the Court was
entirely unbiased in its consideration of this case. For example, it rejected the
argument that El Salvador had in fact sought the assistance of the United States in
defending itself as early as 1981, despite a clear statement to that effect in the
Declaration of Intervention of the Republic of El Salvador, (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J.
215, and despite the absence of evidence to the contrary. See Military and
Paramilitary Activities, 1986 I.C.J. at 87-88, 120-22 (June 27). However, the Court
refused to credit American assertions that the government of Nicaragua was
supporting the groups seeking to overthrow the government of El Salvador, at
least in part simply because Nicaragua denied the assertion, despite evidence
supporting the American claims, id. at 78–79. More seriously, according to Judge
Schwebel, in December, 1984, after the Court had rendered its judgment in
Military and Paramilitary Activities, but before the withdrawal of the United States
from its participation in the matter, then-President Elias not only gave an
interview in which he commented on this pending case, but in the interview
expressly criticized various aspects of the foreign policy of the United States,
Military and Paramilitary Activities, 1986 I.C.J. at 314–15 (Schwebel, J., dissenting);
in his separate opinion, Judge Elias acknowledged the accuracy of Judge
Schwebel’s account of the interview. Id. at 179–80 (separate opinion of Judge
Elias).
226 See supra text accompanying notes 162–67.
227 Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 161, 189, 191–92, 195–96 (Nov. 6).
228 Professor Murphy stresses the importance of the Security Council
resolutions adopted in response to those attacks as a measure of states’
understanding of the scope of the right of self-defense. See Murphy, supra note 10,
at 67–70.
229 S.C. Res. 1378, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1378 (Nov. 14, 2001).
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attacks230 and thus provides at least some guidance as to states’
understanding of the meaning of proportionality and necessity in
the context of self-defense. This raises particular difficulties
because the Court’s apparent assumption that the proportionality
of a defensive response is to be measured against the act
prompting the resort to self-defense, rather than according to the
extent of the future danger the defending state seeks to prevent, is
hard to square with Resolution 1378.
The Court also ignored relevant practice in the advisory
opinion in the Wall Case,231 when it held illegal, as a matter of
customary law, both the seizure of territory by force and the denial
of the right of self-determination. This holding is problematic
because it is difficult to reconcile with the facts of East Timor.232
That case arose after Indonesia seized East Timor by force and
subsequently annexed it, and after the rest of the world essentially
acquiesced in that seizure, despite initially characterizing it as
violating the right to self-determination. 233 This pattern of events
would seem to undercut any argument as to the character of CIL as
the principles the Court applied, but the Wall opinion makes no
reference to international reaction to Indonesia’s actions in East
Timor.
DRC v. Uganda234 is another case in which the Court applied
purported CIL rules at least arguably inconsistent with state
practice. One such situation arose from the Court’s dealing with
the DRC’s claims turning on the relationship between Uganda and
certain Congolese groups rebelling against the government of the
DRC. The Court concluded that, while Uganda had given training
and military support to such groups, it had not controlled them.
The Court, however, took note of language in the General
Assembly’s Declaration on Friendly Relations235 to the effect that
Every State has the duty to refrain from organizing,
instigating, assisting or participating in acts of civil strife or
terrorist acts in another State or acquiescing in organized
231 Id.

pmbl., paras. 2, 4.
Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in Occupied Palestinian
Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136 (July 9).
232 East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), 1995 I.C.J. 90 (June 30).
233 Id. at 103–05.
234 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v.
Uganda), 45 I.L.M. 271, 307 (Dec. 19, 2005).
235 Id. at 308.
231 Legal
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activities within its territory directed towards the
commission of such acts, when the acts referred to in the
present paragraph involve a threat or use of force.236
and that “no State shall organize, assist, foment, [or] finance . . .
armed activities directed towards the violent overthrow of the
regime of another State, or interfere in civil strife in another
State.”237
The Court held that this language stated customary
international law, citing no authority for that proposition, and
relying only on its own decision in Nicaragua for the rule that the
implication of this language is to forbid external support for
internal opposition groups. The Court therefore concluded that
Uganda’s support for anti-government Congolese forces violated
international law.238 As it had done in Nicaragua, the Court placed
no weight on the widespread practice of intervention; indeed, in
DRC v. Uganda, it did not even acknowledge the fact of such
interventions.
A second similar problem in this case was presented by
Uganda’s counterclaims. One of those counter-claims was based
on the DRC’s alleged lack of vigilance in tolerating the operations
of anti-Uganda guerillas on the Congo’s territory. That claim was
based on the same elements of the Declaration on Friendly
Relations that the Court cited as supporting the customary law rule
forbidding states to so much as tolerate actions within their
borders amounting to interference in the affairs of other states, and
the Court acknowledged as much. It held, however, that the DRC
was not responsible for “tolerating” the activities of these groups
because of its practical inability to control the areas where they
operated.239 The Court cited no state practice supporting such a
limitation on the prohibition on which Uganda relied, failing once
again to mention the post-September 11 Security Council
resolutions;240 those resolutions, dealing as they do with a state’s
Id. at 308.
Id.
238 Id. at 308.
239 Uganda was, thus, in the strange position of being forbidden to use force
against insurgent groups as a matter of self-defense because their actions were not
attributable to the DRC, see supra notes 285–86 and accompanying text. Uganda
was also unable to hold the DRC responsible for failing to suppress these groups
because of the weakness of the DRC government.
240 Id.
236
237
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responsibility for the actions of powerful groups operating from
within its territory, were at least relevant state practice, and
arguably inconsistent with the Court’s result.
Finally, the Diallo Case241 presents an interesting twist on the
Court’s failure to confront contrary authority. In that case, the
Court derived its definition of “diplomatic protection”242 from the
ILC’s Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection.243 Draft article 11
discusses the question of diplomatic protection of a corporation
incorporated in the allegedly wrongdoing state, the shares of
which are owned by nationals of the protecting state. The article
provides that the protecting state may provide such protection if
the incorporation was required as a condition of doing business.244
In the Commentary to that article, however, the ILC makes the case
that such protection is allowed even if the incorporation was not
required as a precondition to doing business, noting that its draft
takes a position more conservative than is recognized in practice.245
The Court’s opinion essentially rejects the reasoning of the ILC
commentary, but does not acknowledge that its conclusion is at
odds with the ILC’s reasoning; it mentions draft article 11 only to
note that the case was not one where local incorporation was
forced on a foreign national.246
2.2. Treaties
Any discussion of the relationship between state practice and
treaty interpretation must start with Article 31 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties. Article 31 provides, in relevant
part:
Article 31
General rule of interpretation
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance
with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the
Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Guinea v. Congo), May 24, 2007, 46 I.L.M. 712.
722.
243 See Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Fifty-Eighth
Session, 22–65, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/10 (2006) [hereinafter Diplomatic Protection
Draft Articles].
244 Id. art. 11(b), at 58.
245 Id. at 62–65.
246 Diallo, 46 I.L.M. at 733.
241

242 Id.
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treaty in their context and in the light of its object and
purpose.
...
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the
context:
...
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty
which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its
interpretation ....... 247
That is, according to the Vienna Convention, the practice of
treaty parties in applying the treaty is not merely a source of
enlightenment which may be consulted or not, but a piece of
evidence which must be considered in any case where it is
available.
It must be stressed that the Court has repeatedly held that
Article 31 has passed into CIL, and has relied on it in a number of
cases.248 For example, in the Nuclear Weapons Case,249 the Court
relied on the practice of treaty parties in interpreting several
treaties. The Court observed that “the pattern”250 regarding treaty
prohibitions of weapons of mass destruction was for such weapons
to be prohibited by specific instruments and noting that certain
treaties asserted to make the threat or use of nuclear weapons
illegal contained no such specific prohibition of those weapons.251
The Court also held that certain treaties addressed specifically to

Convention, supra note 16, art 31.
See Border and Transborder Armed Action: Jurisdiction of the Court and
Admissibility of the Application (Nicar. v. Hond.), 1988 ICJ 69, 87–88 (Dec. 20)
(regarding a multilateral treaty); Maritime Delimitation in the Area between
Greenland and Jan Mayen (Den. v. Nor.), 1993 I.C.J. 38, 51–52 (June 14) (involving
a bilateral treaty); Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7,
38 (Sept. 25) (bilateral treaty); Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Bots. v. Namib.), 1999 I.C.J.
1045, 1059, 1075–76 (Dec. 13) (bilateral treaty); Sovereignty Over Pulau Ligitan
and Pulau Sipadan (Indon. v. Malay.), 2002 I.C.J. 625, 645–46, 656–65 (Dec. 17)
(bilateral treaty); Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in Occupied
Palestinian Territory 2004 I.C.J. 136, 172 (July 9) (multilateral treaty).
249 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion,
1996 I.C.J. 226 (July 8).
250 Id. at 248.
251 See id. at 248–49 (contrasting the treatment of nuclear weapons with that of
other weapons of mass destruction).
247 Treaties
248
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nuclear weapons could not be read to prohibit their possession or
use. It based this conclusion in part on the language of those
treaties, but also relied on the failure of treaty parties to object to
certain reservations propounded by states possessing nuclear
weapons, and on the Security Council’s approval of the entire
arrangement.252
The Court has even based interpretations of instruments
accepting its jurisdiction and of its Statute on state practice. In
Land and Maritime Boundary Between Cameroon and Nigeria
(Cameroon v. Nigeria), (Preliminary Objections),253 Nigeria’s
preliminary objections included the assertion that there was no
basis for a judicial determination regarding certain issues because
Cameroon’s submissions to the Court were so lacking in necessary
details that Nigeria was unable to frame a reply to those
submissions, because the Court would be unable to resolve the
questions raised by those submissions, and because an applicant
state was essentially restricted to arguments based on whatever
allegations were set out in its application, with only limited scope
for subsequent expansion. Cameroon responded that it intended
to provide additional details in the course of the litigation and was
free to do so under the rules of the Court.254
The Court rejected Nigeria’s preliminary objection, relying in
part on the implications of its own decisions. It also relied,
however, on what it called “an established practice for States
submitting an application to the Court to reserve the right to
present additional facts and legal considerations.”255
In Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Canada), Jurisdiction, 256 the
Court’s jurisdiction depended on whether a reservation to
Canada’s acceptance of the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction
deprived the Court of jurisdiction in the case. The reservation
excluded from its acceptance of the Court’s compulsory
jurisdiction “disputes arising out of or concerning conservation

252 Id.

at 248–53.
and Maritime Boundary Between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon
v. Nig.), 1998 I.C.J. 275 (June 11).
254 See id. at 317–18 (detailing the claims made by both Nigeria and Cameroon
with respect to Nigeria’s Sixth Preliminary Objection).
255 Id. at 318.
256 Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Can.), 1998 I.C.J. 432 (Dec. 4).
253 Land
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and management measures taken by Canada with respect to
vessels fishing in [a designated ocean area].”257
In its analysis of this question, the Court determined that the
crucial issue was the meaning of the term “conservation and
management measures” as used in the reservation, and that the
phrase should be given the meaning the meaning it had in
international law.258 To determine this meaning, the Court relied
on state practice, which it recounted with great specificity. In
particular, it cited two international multilateral conventions, three
regional multilateral conventions, two bilateral conventions and
the domestic law of Algeria, Argentina, the Malagasy Republic,
New Zealand and the European Economic Community.259
Finally, the Court held that it lacked jurisdiction in Aerial
Incident of 10 August 1999 (Pakistan v. India), Jurisdiction,260 because,
among other reasons, India had interposed a reservation to the
instrument whereby it accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the
Court.261 In the course of reaching this conclusion, the court cited
the practice of states in attaching such reservations to their
declarations of acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction as
demonstrating the permissibility of such reservations.262
However, the Court has not been consistent in its willingness to
rely on the state practice of treaty parties as an element of treaty
interpretation. In LaGrand (Germany v. United States),263 it ignored
state practice regarding the interpretation of its statute. The case
was the result of the violation by the United States of its
obligations to Germany under the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations (“Consular Convention”).264 Specifically, Germany
alleged and the United States conceded that state authorities in
257 Id.

at 457 (citation omitted).
See id. at 458–63 (detailing the Spanish argument that a more restrictive
interpretation of “conservation and management measures” should be adopted
and the Canadian argument for a more expansive interpretation).
259 See id. at 461 (reviewing the usage of “conservation and management
measures” and similar terms across a variety of international conventions and the
domestic laws of Algeria, Argentina, the Malagasy Republic, New Zealand and
the European Economic Community).
260 Aerial Incident of 10 August 1999 (Pak. v. India), 2000 I.C.J. 12 (June 21).
261 Id. at 25–32.
262 Id. at 30.
263 LaGrand (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466 (June 27).
264 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596
U.N.T.S. 261[hereinafter Consular Convention].
258
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Arizona had failed to comply with the obligation under the
Consular Convention265 to inform two German nationals, the
LaGrand brothers, of their right to consult the German consul after
they were arrested for a 1982 murder.266 The LaGrands were
convicted and sentenced to death in 1984. Upon learning of the
treaty breach in 1992, they unsuccessfully sought relief in
American courts, including the Supreme Court. Karl LaGrand was
executed as scheduled on February 24, 1999. On March 2, 1999,
Germany filed its application with the ICJ, requesting provisional
measures, including an order to the effect that the United States
“should take all measures at its disposal to ensure that Walter
LaGrand was not executed” before the Court rendered judgment in
the case, Walter’s execution having been scheduled for March 3.
The Court issued the order for provisional measures on March 3,
and both Germany and Walter LaGrand sought relief from the
United States Supreme Court on that day. Both were unsuccessful,
and Walter LaGrand was executed on March 3, 1999.267
In its memorial, the United States argued on a number of
grounds that provisional measures indicated by the Court imposed
no binding legal obligation.268 In particular, the United States
argued that the practice of states respecting such orders
demonstrates that the parties to the Court’s statute do not read that
treaty as imposing a legally binding obligation to carry out
provisional measures.269 The Court, however, concluded that
orders for provisional measures were indeed legally binding.270
The court did not address all the American arguments, and did not
so much as mention the American argument based on state
265 See id. art. 36, 596 U.N.T.S. at 292, 294 (calling for arresting countries to
inform foreign nationals of their rights without delay).
266 See LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. at 475 (recounting the charges against the LaGrand
brothers at the time of their arrest). There was some dispute between the parties
as to the time at which the relevant American authorities learned that the
LaGrands were German nationals, but all agreed that the authorities were aware
of this fact by late 1984. See id. at 475–76 (noting the initial confusion surrounding
the nationality of the LaGrand brothers).
267 See id. at 475–79 (recounting the trial and appeals of the LaGrand brothers,
the German involvement and the subsequent executions).
268 Counter-Memorial of the United States of America, LaGrand (F.R.G. v.
U.S.) (Mar. 27, 2000), paras. 91, 138–65, available at http://www.icj-cij.org
/docket/files/104/8554.pdf.
269 See id. paras. 161–64 (describing several instances where the I.C.J. found
provisional and interim measures to be non-binding).
270 LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. at 506.
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practice.271
271 See id. at 501–06 (addressing the inconsistency between the English and
French text of Article 41 and comparisons which might be made to illuminate the
appropriate interpretation). Parts of the Court’s analysis are surprising. A crucial
element of the argument of the United States derived from the language of Article
41 of the Statute, which in its English version provides,

1. The Court shall have the power to indicate, if it considers that
circumstances so require, any provisional measures which ought to be
taken to preserve the respective rights of either party.
2. Pending the final decision, notice of the measures suggested shall
forthwith be given to the parties and to the Security Council.
The equally authentic French version provides,
1. La Cour a le pouvoir d’indiquer, si elle estime que les circonstances
l’exigent, quelles mesures conservatoires du droit de chacun doivent être
prises à titre provisoire.
2.
En attendant l’arrêt définitif, l’indication de ces mesures est
immédiatement notifiée aux parties et au Conseil de sécurité ).
Id. at 501–02. The United States argued that the measures could not be
characterized as obligatory since the terms used in the English text to describe the
issuance of such measures, i.e., “indicate,” “suggested,” were not those lawyers
would use to create an obligation. See Counter-Memorial of the United States of
America, LaGrand, paras. 141–52 (detailing the United States argument regarding
the English translation). The Court, however, characterized the word “devoir”
(infinitive form of the word “doivent”) as “having an imperative character,”
Lagrand, 2001 I.C.J. at 502. However, according to LAROUSSE, GRAND DICTIONAIRE
FRANCAIS-ANGLAIS, ANGLAIS-FRANCAISE 274 (1993 ed.), while the first meaning of
the verb “devoir,” when translated into English, is “must,” the second meaning is
“should” or “ought.” The Court purported to resolve what it saw as a difference
in meaning between the English and French texts by resort to Article 33(4) of the
Treaties Convention, supra note 16, which provides, “when a comparison of the
authentic texts discloses a difference of meaning which the application of articles
31 and 32 does not remove, the meaning which best reconciles the texts, having
regard to the object and purpose of the treaty, shall be adopted.” Treaties
Convention, supra note, art 31–32. Since “devoir” can mean “suggest,” one might
expect that the Court, seeking to “reconcile the texts” would accept that the two
versions of Article 41 should in fact be seen as identical and that the Article
should therefore be read as not creating a binding obligation. Instead, the Court
made no effort to reconcile the texts, but leapt to a consideration of the “object and
purpose” of the Statute, concluding on that basis that Article 41 created a binding
obligation. Further, the Court’s consideration of the preparatory work for Article
41 concluded:
The preparatory work of Article 41 shows that the preference given in
the French text to “indiquer” over “ordonner” was motivated by the
consideration that the Court did not have the means to assure the
execution of its decisions. However, the lack of means of execution and
the lack of binding force are two different matters. Hence, the fact that
the Court does not itself have the means to ensure the execution of
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In four cases, the Court failed to give weight to the parties’
interpretation of treaties other than its statute. One of these was
LaGrand. The LaGrands had been denied habeas corpus relief in
U.S. Federal court on the ground that, having failed to raise their
Consular Convention argument in the earlier state proceedings,
they had essentially waived the argument—the so-called rule of
procedural default. In the ICJ case, Germany argued that
application of the procedural default rule was a violation of Article
36.272 The United States asserted that the Article 36 claim was
inadmissible in that Germany was seeking to hold the United
States to a standard in the application of that provision stricter than
that which it followed itself.273 Further, it asserted in its written
pleadings that, based on investigations by American officials,
“States Party to the Vienna Convention throughout the world
operate on the understanding that a criminal proceeding against a
foreign national can proceed regardless of whether consular
notification is provided.”274
The Court rejected both arguments. As to the admissibility
argument, the Court distinguished the German cases upon which
the United States relied as entailing “relatively light criminal
penalties” and as providing no evidence regarding German
practice respecting criminal defendants facing severe penalties.
Acknowledging that the Consular Convention draws no
distinction in Article 36 between the severity of the penalties faced
by arrested persons, the Court held that “it does not follow
therefrom that the remedies for a violation of this Article must be
identical in all situations.”275 The Court simply did not respond to
the United States’s argument regarding state practice with respect
to the proper interpretation of Article 36; it rejected the United

orders made pursuant to Article 41 is not an argument against the
binding nature of such orders.
LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. at 505. In other words, since the Court disagreed with the
reasons the drafters of the Statute gave for refraining from making Article 41
mandatory, it chooses to disregard clear evidence that, as far as the drafters were
concerned, it was not mandatory.
272 Id. at 488.
273 Id. at 496–97.
274 Counter-Memorial of the United States, LaGrand (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2000
I.C.J, para. 91.
275 LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. at 489.
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States’s reading of that Article based solely on its exegesis of the
language of the treaty.276
Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States of
America),277 another Consular Convention case, presented a similar
situation. One element of Mexico’s claim was that the Vienna
Convention was properly interpreted as requiring the United
States to inform foreign nationals of their Convention rights as
soon as they were detained.278 As in LaGrand, the United States’s
argument against this position depended in part on a detailed
examination of the practice of states in implementing Article 36.279
As it did with a similar American argument in LaGrand,280 the
Court simply ignored the argument based on state practice in
considering the issue, though it rejected Mexico’s claim on other
grounds.281 It only addressed this point obliquely, in the course of
rejecting the American argument that Mexico’s claim was
inadmissible because it was seeking to impose on the United States
a standard which its own behavior did not satisfy.282
The Wall Case presents a similar problem because of the Court’s
rejection of Israel’s argument based on Article 51 of the Charter.
Article 51 was irrelevant both because, according to the Court,
Article 51 applies only to self-defense against attacks attributable to
another state, which was not the case with respect to the attacks of
which Israel complained, and because the attacks originated from
areas under Israel’s occupation. This latter point, again according
to the Court, rendered irrelevant the Security Council resolutions
condemning terrorism adopted in the wake of the attacks in the
United States on September 11, 2001. In fact, those resolutions
amount to state practice undercutting that conclusion. This is true
because—although the preambles of both resolutions refer to
“international peace and security” and/or “international
terrorism,”—both refer only to “terrorism” in their operative

31).

276 Id.

at 495–98.
and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12 (Mar.

278 Id.

at 66–67.

277 Avena

279 Counter-Memorial

for the United States, Avena and Other Mexican
Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.) (U.S. Avena Counter-Memorial), 2004 I.C.J. 12, 89–98
(Mar. 31).
280 See supra text accompanying notes 263–67.
281 Avena and Other Mexican Nationals, 2004 I.C.J. at 67–68.
282 Id. at 61.
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paragraphs,283 and because those resolutions were adopted in
response to an attack which, from the beginning of the actual
operation until its end, took place in the territory of the state
attacked, as Professor Murphy has pointed out.284
DRC v. Uganda,285 in holding that Article 51 did not permit
Uganda to use force against anti-Uganda guerillas within DRC
territory because the acts of those guerrillas could not be attributed
to the DRC,286 similarly failed to give weight to the post September
11 Security Council resolutions as relevant state practice.
2.3. Summary
The foregoing discussion makes clear that the Court’s
treatment of state practice has been quite inconsistent regarding
both the determination of the content of CIL and the interpretation
of treaties. To recapitulate the situation regarding CIL, the Court’s
activity can be broken down into 5 categories: 1) reliance on actual
state practice as the source of CIL rules; 2) reliance on either
secondary sources of law (judicial opinions or the writings of
scholars) or non-binding instruments (e.g., General Assembly
resolutions, actions of international conferences) as the source of
rules, even though reliance on state practice would have produced
the same result; 3) drawing CIL rules from secondary sources of
law; 4) asserting the existence of rules of CIL without providing
any basis for the assertion other than doubtful sources; 5) asserting
283 S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001) (expressing
sympathy for the U.S. after September 11 and agreeing to continue considering
the issue of terrorism); S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001)
(condemning the use of terrorism and directing states to stop funding or
supporting terrorist organizations and work together to prevent further attacks).
284 Murphy, supra note 10, at 68 (discussing the seemingly arbitrary factual
distinction the ICJ draws between the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United
States—a result of a threat the ICJ says originated outside U.S. territory—and the
attacks in Israeli territory, that the ICJ says were entirely domestic). It is also
worth noting that the Court’s conclusion that Article 51 applies only to defense
against attacks imputable to a state has no support in the text of the article, as
Judge Koojimans noted in his separate opinion in the Wall Case. Legal
Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in Occupied Palestinian Territory
2004 I.C.J. 136, 1072 (July 9) (Koojimans, J. sep. opin.). Professor Murphy has also
pointed out that the classic statement of the parameters of the right of self-defense
was formulated in the context of an action not attributable to a state. Murphy,
supra note 10, at 64–65.
285 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v.
Uganda), 45 I.L.M. 271 (Dec. 19, 2005).
286 Id. at 306.
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the existence of rules of CIL drawn from secondary sources and
non-binding instruments when the asserted rules are actually
contradicted by significant state practice. With respect to treaties,
the Court has invoked the rule that treaties are to be interpreted in
light of the practice of the treaty parties and has followed this rule
in some cases. In others, however, it did not follow the rule; in
those cases, furthermore, it did not acknowledge the existence
either of the rule or of the practice of the treaty parties. In none of
these cases did the Court explain its choice to proceed in one way
or another or offer any legal rationale for its different methods of
analysis.
The next section turns to an analysis of the Court’s
performance.
3.

WHAT THE COURT SEEMS TO BE DOING, AND
WHY WE SHOULD CARE

3.1. What the Court is Doing
The preceding discussion addressed 27 cases, each offering the
Court the opportunity to ground its analysis of the relevant law in
the practice of states, either because the case presented issues of
CIL or because the case involved a treaty interpretation issue,
which could have been addressed by considering the practice
under the treaty of the treaty parties. Examination of these cases
makes it possible to see some patterns of arguably problematic
behavior in the Court’s proceedings. This Section of the Article
seeks to identify those patterns. The following Section addresses
their legal implications.
One may, roughly, divide the patterns the cases present into
two groups: those involving the actions and institutions the Court
treats as being sources of rules of law, and those involving the
analytical techniques the Court brings to bear in its consideration
of these sources. In treaty cases, the source of the parties’
obligations will be uncontroversial—it would be whatever the
relevant treaty was. Therefore, the sources question can arise only
in cases involving CIL. The issue of analytical techniques,
however, can arise either in CIL cases or in treaty interpretation
cases, since, obviously, both present problems of analysis.
3.1.1.

Sources of law
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The first source of law to consider is state practice, as defined
above.287 Surprisingly, the Court seems to have paid relatively
little attention to this source of law. Only in the Nuclear Weapons
Case288 did the result turn on the actual practice of states (in that
case, nuclear deterrence). The Court did not describe that practice,
referring only to “the policy of deterrence.” Since the nature of the
policy was well-known and, at the time of the decision, only the
five permanent members of the Security Council admitted to
possessing nuclear weapons289 the Court’s bare reference to the
practice was arguably adequate both to describe the sort of activity
in which states were engaging and to indicate which states were
acting. The Court’s description of the practice on which it relied
nonetheless seems remarkably terse.
In the other cases in which the Court made reference to state
practice, its description of that practice was even less specific. In
the Continental Shelf Case,290 the Court cited the practice of states in
holding that the institution of the Exclusive Economic Zone had
passed into CIL, among other holdings, but did not describe the
practice, or even indicate the number of states involved.291 It
further held that use of one particular method of delimitation of
the continental shelf was shown to be acceptable, albeit not
mandatory, by the seventy agreements between states delimiting
their shelves.292 While the Court at least indicated the number of
instances of practices at issue on this point, it provided no further
information.
In the other two cases in which the Court purported to rely on
state practice to determine the content of CIL, its treatment of CIL
was even less explicit. In DRC v. Belgium,293 the Court’s description
of the state practice on which it relied was non-existent in one part

287 See

8).

discussion, supra Section 2.1.1.
or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226 (July

288 Threat

289 It was only in 1996 that India and Pakistan admitted to acquiring those
weapons. See, e.g., Barbara Crossette, South Asian Arms Race: Reviving Dormant
Fears of Nuclear War, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 1998, at A9.
290 Continental Shelf (Libya v. Malta), 1985 I.C.J. 13 (July 3).
291 Id. at 33, 38.
292 Id. at 38.
293 Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 3
(Feb. 14).
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of the opinion, and sketchy in the other.294 In the Diallo Case,295 the
Court described the practice on which the applicant relied, but
provided very little explanation for its conclusion that the practice
did not show the existence of a CIL rule.296
In the foregoing cases, the Court at least purported to rely on
state practice to establish a CIL rule. In the remaining CIL cases,
however, the Court failed to address state practice. This was most
surprising in those cases where state practice would have strongly
supported the result the Court reached.297 In the Gulf of Maine,298
Continental Shelf,299 and Denmark v. Norway300 judgments, the Court
made no express mention of the very large numbers of states
claiming exclusive economic zones, though that practice would
have supported its purported CIL result. In Hungary v. Slovakia301
and the Special Rapporteur Advisory Opinion,302 the Court chose to
rely on the conclusions the ILC had reached regarding certain rules
of CIL, rather than on the practice, which had been carefully
described by the ILC, on which those conclusions were based. And
in the other CIL cases discussed, the Court either made no
reference to state practice, or ignored or mischaracterized practice
contrary to the result it reached. While some of these cases were
conventional border disputes, lending themselves to resolution
through reliance on subsidiary sources of law, others were not.303
Id. at 20–22, 23–24 (discussing “state practice” and “international custom”
surrounding immunities of Ministers of Foreign Affairs and how the immunity
applies to allegations of certain crimes such as war crimes or crimes against
humanity with only minimal references to examples of actual international
practice).
295 Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Guinea v. Congo), May 24, 2007, 46 I.L.M. 712.
296 Id. paras. 89–90 (concluding that some international agreements,
provisions in many contracts and certain special cases were not sufficient
evidence of customary international law).
297 See supra text accompanying notes 52–80.
298 Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Can. v.
U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 246 (Oct. 12) (Gulf of Maine Case).
299 Continental Shelf (Libya v. Malta), 1985 I.C.J. 13 (June 3) (Continental
Shelf Case).
300 Maritime Delimitation in the Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen
(Den. v. Nor.), 1993 I.C.J. 38 (June 14) (Denmark v. Norway).
301 Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7 (Sept. 25)
(Hungary v. Slovakia).
302 Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a Special
Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, Advisory Opinion, 1999 I.C.J.
62 (Apr. 29) (Special Rapporteur Advisory Opinion).
303 See supra text accompanying notes 81–233.
294
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These results, it should be stressed, cannot be explained as
flowing from some difficulty the Court has encountered in recent
decades in determining the content of state practice. Its careful
discussion of practice in interpreting the treaty at issue in Spain v.
Canada304 shows that, when it chose to do so, the Court was capable
of subjecting practice to very thorough examination.
It is clear then that what the Court has not been doing in CIL
cases is basing its judgments on carefully described state practice.
What is has been doing instead is also significant: it has been
relying on international bodies, the governing legal instruments of
which confer on them no authority to create general obligations in
international law. More precisely, the Court has relied, 1) on
actions by the General Assembly and by states meeting in
international conferences; 2) on determinations by bodies
composed of individual experts; and 3) on its own precedents and
policy determinations. Each of these categories requires some
comment.
The Court expressly relied on General Assembly resolutions to
support its results in Nicaragua, Merits,305 in the Nuclear Weapons
Case, 306 in the Wall Case,307 and in DRC v. Uganda.308 Indeed, in
Hungary v. Slovakia,309 the Court even relied on the General
Assembly’s adoption of a treaty text as establishing the treaty’s
provisions as CIL,310 even though the treaty in question was not
then in force, and in fact has never come into force.311

Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Can.), 1998 I.C.J. 432, 461 (Dec. 4) (Spain v.
Canada) (tracking the meaning of the term “conservation and management
measures” from the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and a variety of other
treaties and conventions amongst many European and North American
countries).
305 Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27)
(Nicaragua, Merits).
306 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion,
1996 I.C.J. 226, 242–43 (July 8) (Nuclear Weapons Case).
307 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 171–72, 176 (July 9) (Wall
Case).
308 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v.
Uganda), 45 I.L.M. 271, 308–09, Dec. 19, 2005 (DRC v. Uganda).
309 Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7 (Sept. 25)
(Hungary v. Slovakia).
310 Id. at 56.
311 See, International
Water Law Project, Status of the Convention,
http://www.internationalwaterlaw.org/documents/intldocs/watercourse_status
304
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The Court based its judgment on the work of international
conferences in a number of cases. The Court relied on the work of
the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea—even
as it acknowledged that the treaty the Conference had produced
had not yet gone into force—in the Gulf of Maine Case,312 the
Continental Shelf Case,313 and Denmark v. Norway.314 Similarly, in
Nicaragua, Merits, the Court characterized the acceptance by the
United States of certain non-binding resolutions at international
conferences as demonstrating opinio juris regarding a principle of
CIL.
The Court, as noted above, also relied on the work of certain
expert bodies, such as the ILC315 and the Human Rights
the
Committee,316 as sources for rules of law. Certainly,
individuals who compose such bodies would count as falling
among those “highly qualified publicists” whose work the Statute
of the Court describes as subsidiary means for determining the
content of international law. In that sense, there is more basis for
reliance on their pronouncements than for reliance on actions by
the General Assembly or international conferences. Even here,
however, the Court’s approach has been curious. It does not
appear to have treated the work of such bodies as subsidiary
means of determining the content of international law, but rather
as having the same force as other sources mentioned in Article 38.
For example, in the Special Rapporteur Advisory Opinion,317 the Court
referred to the ILC’s draft Articles on State responsibility,318 but not
to the state practice on which those articles were based and which

.html (last visited Dec, 3, 2009) (tracking the very limited number of states that
have signed and ratified the Watercourse Convention, as of Nov. 28, 2009).
312 Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Can. v.
U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 246, 294 (Oct. 12) (Gulf of Maine Case).
313 Continental Shelf (Libya v. Malta) 1985 I.C.J. 13, 40–41 (June 3).
314 Maritime Delimitation in the Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen
(Den. v. Nor.), 1993 I.C.J. 38, 62 (June 14) (Denmark v. Norway).
315 See Gabčíkovo -Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, 72
(Sept. 25) (Hungary v. Slovakia); Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal
Process of a Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, Advisory
Opinion, 1999 I.C.J. 62, 87 (Apr. 29) (Special Rapporteur Advisory Opinion).
316 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 179 (July 9) (Wall Case).
317 Special Rapporteur Advisory Opinion, 1999 I.C.J. at 87.
318 Id. at 87.
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was described in the ILC’s commentary to its draft.319 Yet if the
works of publicists are subsidiary to state practice, one would
expect the court to rely on the primary rather than on the
subsidiary source, especially when the primary source was easily
Court’s
available.320 A particularly striking example of the
attempts to justify reliance on expert bodies is presented by the
Court’s justification, in the Wall Case, for citing a declaration by the
ICRC interpreting the Fourth Geneva Convention. The Court
quoted an article of that treaty apparently to support the argument
that the Committee’s treaty interpretations were authoritative;321
however, read in context, the article clearly refers to other issues
entirely.322
Finally, the Court has relied on its own decisions as authority
supporting particular propositions of law. Now, in one sense, this
cannot be surprising. If the Court has examined a legal issue once,
it would be a waste of time for the Court to exhaustively re-analyze
the issue in future cases, all things being equal. The difficulty
arises in cases where all things are not equal, that is, when there
have been legally relevant developments subsequent to a decision
by the Court which could, at least, require a result different from
that the Court originally reached. For example, as discussed
above,323 the Court in the Genocide Casefollowed Nicaragua, Merits
in its approach to determining whether a government was
responsible for the acts of armed groups. 324 It referred to no
authority besides its own decision and that of the ICTY in the Tadić
Case325 in addressing the issue. Yet there had, during the period
between the two decisions, been a number of incidents of state

319 Int’l Law Comm’n, Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of
Its Twenty-fifth Session 7 May–13 July, 1973, at 36, U.N. Doc. A/9010/REV.1 (1973),
reprinted in 2 Y.B. INT’L COMM’N 1983, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1973.
320 Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Guinea v. Congo), May 24, 2007, 46 I.L.M. 712,
para. 39. The Court relied on an ILC draft for a definition of the term “diplomatic
protection”—a definition so uncontroversial as, arguably, requiring no supporting
authority at all.
321 Wall Case, 2004 I.C.J. at 176.
322 See Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 176, art. 142.
323 See supra text accompanying notes 173–90.
324 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.), 2007 I.C.J. 188, 248 (Feb. 26)
(Genocide Case).
325 Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment,
(July 15, 1999).
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practice arguably relevant to the issue.326 Since the issue was one
of CIL, it would seem that the Court could have been expected to
examine these instances of practice subsequent to Nicaragua, Merits
to assure itself that this more recent practice did not require
modification of the views it had expressed in that case. It did not
do so, however—in essence treating its decision and that of the
ICTY as the only sources of law it needed to consider.
In addition to relying on its own decisions as precedent, the
Court has also explicitly justified results on the basis of its own,
independent policy analysis. In DRC v. Belgium,327 the basis for the
Court’s decision was its conclusion regarding the policy difficulties
which it asserted would be created if Belgium were to be allowed
to go ahead with its criminal proceedings.328 Similarly, in the
Genocide Case, the Court rejected the attribution standard urged by
Bosnia-Herzegovina because of what the Court saw as the practical
difficulties that standard would create.329
3.1.2.

Analytical Technique

The foregoing discussion addressed arguably problematic
approaches to sources of law the Court has employed over the
period under examination. This portion of the discussion focuses
on the methods of analysis that seem to raise questions.
The first of these analytical problems is the lack of transparency
in the Court’s opinions. In a surprising number of cases, the Court
has asserted the existence of a particular rule of law without
explaining how it has come to conclude that the rule is a rule, even
though the existence of the rule is by no means uncontroversial.
There are a number of examples.
In the Gulf of Maine Case, the Court based its analysis of CIL in
part on actions taken at the Third United Nations Conference on
the Law of the Sea, rather than on the practice of a very large
number of states; while the Court stressed the degree of consensus
at the Conference and the acceptance of the principle in question
by the United States, despite overall American objections to
UNCLOS, it did not explain why these elements created a rule of
326 See CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 161–67 (2d
ed. 2004). (Discussing arguably relevant incidents).
327 Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 3
(Feb. 14) (DRC v. Belgium).
328 Id. at 20–22.
329 Genocide Case, 2007 I.C.J. at 286–88.
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law. In the Continental Shelf Case and later in Denmark v. Norway,
the Court simply repeated its conclusions from the Gulf of Maine
Case, ignoring extensive state practice supporting its result and
again failing to explain why it did not rest its judgment on what
presumably would have been the strongest available foundation.
The Court stated in Nicaragua, Merits,330 with respect to CIL
rules which states had violated, that:
If a State acts in a way prima facie incompatible with a
recognized rule, but defends its conduct by appealing to
exceptions or justifications contained within the rule itself,
then whether or not the State’s conduct is in fact justifiable
on that basis, the significance of that attitude is to confirm
rather than to weaken the rule.331
The Court simply asserted this conclusion without explaining
the reasoning behind it. In the same case, in a purported effort to
determine whether there was opinio juris supporting the argument
that the Charter’s use of force rules had become part of CIL, the
Court treated the Declaration on Friendly Relations332 as evidence
of that opinio juris, asserting that “[t]he effect of consent to the text
of such resolutions cannot be understood as merely that of a
‘reiteration or elucidation’ of the treaty commitment undertaken in
the Charter,” but “may be understood as an acceptance of the
validity of the rule or set of rules declared by the resolution by
themselves.”333 The Court did not explain why this should be so.
It likewise did not explain its rationale for labeling as a
demonstration of opinio juris for this principle the acceptance by
the United States of non-binding resolutions at two international
conferences and its ratification of a treaty. Also in this case, the
Court simply announced the standard it applied to determine
whether the acts of the Nicaraguan contras could be attributed to
the United States without explaining the derivation of this
standard. As described above,334 the ICJ dealt with a similar issue
in the same way in the Genocide Case, supporting its conclusion
330

27).

Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June

331 Id.

at 98.

on Friendly Relations, supra note 133.
and Paramilitary Activities, 1986 I.C.J. at 99–100.
334 See supra text accompanying notes 191–94 (discussing in more detail the
nature of the Genocide Case).
332 Declaration
333 Military
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regarding attribution only by reference to another unexplained
conclusion regarding the consequences of using a standard
different from the one it had selected. This latter point is
particularly striking in light of the ICTY opinion to which the
Court in the Genocide Case was responding; the ICTY’s opinion was
carefully reasoned, while that of the ICJ rested simply on assertion.
In the Oil Platforms Case, as noted above,335 the Court in effect
asserted that 1) a state is the victim of an armed attack only if the
attack is directed specifically at it; indiscriminate attacks do not
count; 2) an armed action by the armed forces of one state against
those of another is not necessarily an armed attack; whether it is
depends on its gravity; 3) an action taken in self-defense cannot
satisfy the necessity requirement unless it is preceded by a formal
complaint by the ostensibly defending state, however pointless the
making of such a complaint might be; and 4) the proportionality
criterion in the law of self-defense is evaluated in terms of the
harm already inflicted, not that to be avoided. The Court provided
no authority for any of these propositions, nor did it otherwise
explain their derivation.
In the Wall Case,336 the Court asserted, without explanation, that
a state could not assert the right of self-defense to justify using
force against a territory under Article 51 of the Charter if the
danger against which the state wished to act was not created by
another state,337 even though Article 51 sets out no such limitation.
It took a similar position, with a similar lack of explanation, in DRC
v. Uganda.338
In addition to its failure to explain the basis for the rules it has
applied, the Court, in some cases, has adopted methods of analysis
inconsistent with those used in other cases, but has made no
reference to the arguments it fails to address, an omission which
has the effect of concealing the inconsistency. Obviously, if the
Court does not acknowledge a departure from previous analytical
practice, it does not explain the legal rationale for the departure.
This problem appears in LaGrand, with respect to both the
American argument regarding the binding character of provisional
335 See

supra text accompanying notes 155–65.
Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, 2004 I.C.J. 136 (July 9) (Wall Case).
337 Id. at 194.
338 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v.
Uganda), Dec. 19. 2005, 45 I.L.M. 271 (DRC v. Uganda).
336 Legal
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measures under Article 41,339 and the American argument as to the
proper interpretation of Article 36 of the Consular Convention.340
In both instances, the United States asserted an interpretation of a
treaty based on the practice of the parties to the treaty with respect
to the provision in question. Despite its frequent holdings that
such practice was to be considered in cases of treaty interpretation,
the Court not only failed to consider the practice, but failed to
acknowledge that the practice existed. Similarly, in Avena,
although the United States based its disagreement with the
Mexican interpretation of Article 36 of the Consular Convention in
part on the practice of the parties to that treaty, the Court did not
even acknowledge that the argument had been made.341 Similarly,
in the Diallo Case, the Court relied on the ILC’s Draft Articles on
Diplomatic Protection for some aspects of its judgment, but did not
address the fact that the ILC had, in the commentaries to those
articles, reached a conclusion contrary to that reached by the Court
regarding another issue in the case.342 Further, in addressing that
issue, the Court took note of arguments raised by Guinea, but
failed to mention that one of the authorities upon which Guinea
relied was the ILC.343
Finally, in Nicaragua, Merits, it flatly misstated state practice. It
did this when it rationalized its refusal to put weight on states’
interventions in the internal affairs of other states in part by
asserting that intervening states never offered legal justifications
for their actions.344 In fact, as discussed above,345 in several notable
instances, intervening states had made explicit both their beliefs
339 Compare Counter-Memorial of the United States, LaGrand (F.R.G. v. U.S.),
2000 I.C.J. paras. 91, 138–65 (Mar. 27), with LaGrand, (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J.
499, 501–06 (June 27).
340 Compare Counter-Memorial of the United States., LaGrand, 2000 I.C.J. at
para. 91, with LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. at 495–98.
341 Compare Counter-Memorial for the United States, Avena and Other
Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12 (Nov. 3), 89–98, paras. 6.32–6.43
(Mar. 31), with Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12,
67–68 (Mar. 31).
342 Compare Diplomatic Protection Draft Articles, supra note 243, at 62–65, with
Diallo Case (Guinea v. Congo), Preliminary Objections, 2007 I.C.J. 1, 29–31.
343 See Preliminary Objections, Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Guinea v. Dem. Rep.
Congo) 46 I.L.M. 712 (Diallo Case).
344 Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 108–10
(June 27).
345 See supra note 224 (explaining various states’ interventions in other
countries and their justifications for intervening).
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that their actions were justified and the legal arguments
supporting those conclusions.
3.2. Why We Should Care About the Court’s Approach
3.2.1.

Introduction

We see then that, over the period in question, the Court has
generally dealt with state practice in a fairly summary fashion;
relied, as sources of legal rules, on entities whose legal authority is
doubtful; frequently failed to explain the derivation of the rules
upon which it relies; failed sometimes even to mention arguably
plausible counter-arguments raised either by the parties or by
authorities upon which the Court purported to rely and, once,
flatly misstated the content of state practice.
Beyond the foregoing observations, however, it is important to
note two important implications of these patterns of behavior on
the part of the Court. First, it appears to be attempting to shift the
authority to make international law from states to non-state
international bodies. States make law through their practice and
through concluding and subsequently applying treaties. If the
Court gives little attention to state practice, and, in at least some
cases, disregards clear indications of the parties’ understanding of
otherwise ambiguous treaty language, the Court is effectively
limiting the law-making role of states. Conversely, it is necessarily
magnifying the role of other international bodies if it ascribes
binding legal effect to General Assembly resolutions, to the
determinations of international conferences, to groups of experts in
international law, and to its own earlier decisions.
The second implication of the patterns of the Court’s behavior
is that it seems to be moving away from what could be reasonably
called a judicial role to that of a free-form policy maker. One
normally expects a tribunal to explain the reasoning from which it
derives the legal rules it applies, but the ICJ has, as described,
failed to do so on a number of occasions. One also expects courts
to provide guidance to the community by explaining the flaws in
the legal arguments it rejects, which necessarily requires the court
to note that the argument has been made. To fail even to
acknowledge that a party has made a particular argument makes it
impossible for the parties and the international community
generally to understand the legal basis for disregarding the
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argument—and necessarily feeds the suspicion that the argument
was ignored, not because it was incorrect, but because it was both
correct and inconsistent with the result the Court wished to reach.
Naturally, if the Court misstates the facts, these suspicions can only
be reinforced.
This section examines the difficulties these practices raise.
3.2.2.

Sources of law

The question of the sources from which the Court draws what
it labels rules of CIL can seem a drily technical one. It is more than
that. CIL purports to govern the behavior of all states; treaties,
however, govern only the behavior of treaty parties. Therefore,
authority to make CIL amounts to authority to control the actions
of every state in the world. Since states are the mechanisms
through which their populations interact, controlling all states
means controlling all people. Explaining how it happens that this
or that source of CIL may come to have so far-reaching an effect
goes beyond mere technicality. Rather, such an explanation is at
the heart of political legitimacy.
It is easy enough to justify reliance on state practice as a source
of the CIL the Court applies. In the first place, the Court is
constrained to rely on state practice by its statute. Beyond that
point, states have a considerable claim to be speaking for their
populations, and, to the extent that they do, it is simply an exercise
of that authority when they create obligations for themselves that
impact their populations. Further, states are the institutions far
and away best able to ensure that CIL rules actually govern
international relations, since states have a great deal of control of
the resources of their populations, and thus have a broad range of
means for giving practical effect to their decisions.
As discussed above, however, the Court in recent decades has,
to a great extent, shifted its focus with respect to CIL away from
states, looking instead to resolutions of the General Assembly, to
actions by international conferences (as opposed to considering the
legal effect of any treaties those conferences may produce), to
determinations by expert bodies, and to its own decisions. For the
Court to treat such materials as sources of law raises a number of
problems.
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In the first place, as Reisman has observed, Article 38 of the
Statute of the Court is a choice of law clause.346 Its terms are
mandatory. Even if it could somehow be argued that international
law has seen the emergence of new sources of law since 1945,
Article 38 represents the unequivocal determination of the states
whose governments accepted the statute that the Court would be
permitted to rely solely on the sources listed in Article 38 to
produce the rules of law which it applies.
This might seem like a mindlessly formalistic approach. There
are at least two arguments against that objection. First, the basic
question raised by any person or group purporting to exercise
legal authority is, why should anyone feel obliged to pay any
attention to what these people say? Why are the judges of the
Court anything more than fifteen people wearing robes? The
answer, surely, is that they are authorized to exercise the powers
they exercise. If, however, that is the answer, then to the extent
that the judges seek to exercise powers beyond those authorized,
they are simply fifteen people wearing robes. And for the Court to
apply sources of law not listed in Article 38 is for it to do just that
and to go beyond its authority.
The second argument against this stress on the language of
Article 38 flows from an analogy to the federal courts in the United
States. At the time of the drafting of the Constitution, one concern
about the establishment of a federal government was the fear that
such a government must necessarily become a tyranny. The
federal courts’ rigid enforcement of limits on their jurisdiction
reflected the triumph of the idea that, as the possessor of one
aspect of federal power, it was as necessary for the courts as for the
other branches of the federal government to respect the
Constitution’s limits on that power.347 Any other approach, it was
thought, would weaken the fabric of the country.
The Court’s position is, if anything, more precarious than that
of the federal courts in the early days of the United States. Lacking
either compulsory jurisdiction or, as a practical matter, any means
W. MICHAEL REISMAN, SYSTEMS OF CONTROL IN INTERNATIONAL
ADJUDICATIONS AND ARBITRATION: BREAKDOWN AND REPAIR (1992).
347 See Stewart Jay, Origins of Federal Common Law: Part One, 133 U. PA. L. REV.
1003, 1033, 1111–13 (1985) (summarizing the political history behind the issue of
defining the boundaries of federal common law); Stewart Jay, Origins of Federal
Common Law: Part Two, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 1231, 1241–42 (1985) (discussing
development of a separation-of-powers principle that limits the jurisdiction of the
federal court system in the United States).
346
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of enforcing its judgments, its effectiveness depends entirely on the
states’ willingness to accept those judgments. For the Court to
depart from the terms of the Statute which specify the sources it
may treat as giving rise to law, therefore, is to risk defiance.
The foregoing point addresses the extent of the Court’s
discretion to look to sources of law other than those the Statute
identifies, or to treat certain sources which the Statute designates
as subsidiary means for the determination of law as though they
were primary sources of law. But even if the issue were the
propriety of some institution not constrained by Article 38 to rely
on the sources the Court has come to emphasize, one must still
determine how it is that those sources can be considered law.
The most basic question goes to formal authorization.
Consider first the General Assembly. According to the Charter of
the United Nations, the General Assembly’s authority to take
actions regarding matters other than the internal functioning of the
organizations extends no further than the power to make
recommendations, albeit regarding a broad variety of subjects.348
As Professor Thirlway has observed:
[T]he question of the effects of an Assembly resolution and
that of the significance of the voting can become entangled
in a sort of vicious circle: as the representative of Russia
reminded the Court [during the argument on the Nuclear
Weapons Case]: ‘Many States prefer rather to vote in favour
of these resolutions or abstain from voting, than to vote
against them, having precisely in mind that, according to
the Charter, they do not create any legal norm and do not
imply the recognition of any rules as such, but are only of
recommendatory nature . . . . The point is that, for each
individual State participating in the voting, its vote is not
directed to a particular dispute or situation affecting it, but
is merely a general announcement of what it might contend
if such a dispute or situation arose. Furthermore, if it were
an established principle that voting for a purportedly
declaratory resolution constituted acceptance of the rule
therein stated, then to vote in this way would have an
immediate impact on the legal position of the voting State;
but so long as there exists no such principle, the vote by
348 U.N.

Charter arts. 10–14.
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each State is legally insignificant because it is known (and
intended) to be insignificant.349
There is a further problem beyond that presented by the
knowledge of states and their representatives that General
Assembly resolutions have no legal effect—one of logic. For
example, in the Nuclear Weapons Case, the Court noted that
“General Assembly resolutions, even if they are not binding, may
sometimes have normative value. They can, in certain
circumstances, provide evidence important for establishing the
existence of a rule or the emergence of an opinio juris.”350 However,
a vote for a resolution can indicate opinio juris only if it commits
the voting state to the proposition that whatever rule the resolution
asserts is legally binding. But if the vote is non-binding, it is
unclear how it can commit the state to anything.
The Court’s effective ascription of formal authority to
international conferences is at least as difficult to justify as its
giving controlling weight to General Assembly resolutions. Just as
the U.N. Charter accords no legal effect to General Assembly
resolutions, actions at conferences in themselves have no legal
effect. To be sure, a conference may produce a treaty; it may also
demonstrate the existence of an apparent consensus on some
subject which leads states to take specific actions regarding
concrete issues. However, until there is reason to see the actions of
a conference as having affected some issue outside the conference
hall, there seems to be no basis for ascribing any legal
consequences to the mere fact that a conference met and, perhaps,
took non-binding stands on this or that issue. After all, states may
find even a treaty produced by a conference unacceptable despite
their representatives having agreed on a text.351
349 Hugh Thirlway, The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice
1960–1989, 76 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 1, 99–100 (2006) (quoting Verbatim Record,
Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict and Legality
of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion (Nov. 10, 1995),
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/93/5964.pdf).
350 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion,
1996 I.C.J. 226, 254–55 (July 8) (italics in original).
351 For example, even though the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
Between States and International Organizations or Between International
Organizations was adopted by the General Assembly in Decision 41/420, it has
not yet become effective. See United Nations Treaty Collection, Status of Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International
Organizations or between International Organizations, http://treaties.un.org
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The situation of expert bodies as sources of law is somewhat
different from that of the General Assembly or of a conference. As
already noted, the work of bodies such as the ILC can fairly be
considered subsidiary means for the determination of international
law within the meaning of article 38(1)(d). However, the Court
cites the work of such bodies even when information on primary
sources is available, for example, the ILC’s own reports on state
practice regarding the subjects it addresses. The implication is that
the Court’s focus is not on the actions of states, but on the
determinations of the body of experts. This would seem justifiable
only if the instruments establishing these bodies invest them with
the power to make CIL.352 Those instruments contain no such
provision. For example, nothing in the Statute of the ILC gives it
the authority to make law; it is authorized to propose actions to
states, not to change the law by its own action.353
Similarly, the Court’s reliance on its own decisions cannot be
based on any grant of authority. On the contrary, Article 59 of the
Statute provides that the Court’s decisions have no binding force,
except between the parties and with respect to the particular case.
And Article 38(1)(d) makes explicit that the Court’s authority to
treat judicial decisions as subsidiary means for the determination
of rules of law is subject to Article 59.354 Again, this is not to say
that, when the Court has thoroughly examined a particular CIL
issue in one case, it must always repeat the discussion in later cases
even if nothing has happened since the first decision which could
be thought to change the legal rule. It is rather to say that, when
the Court’s citation to an earlier case is anything more than a “see
discussion at” reference, it appears to violate the express language
of its Statute.
Judge Shahabuddeen has attempted to defend the Court’s
reliance on its own case law, but his arguments are flawed.
/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXIII-3&chapter=23&lang
=en (last visited Dec. 3, 2009).
352 See, e.g., Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Fortyninth Session, 12 May–18 July 1997, supra note 185, at paras. 76, 85–87, 134, available
at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/A_52_10.pdf (referencing
the scope of authority of committees established to monitor compliance with
human rights treaties).
353 See Statute of the International Law Commission, G.A. Res. 174 (II), U.N.
Doc. A/519, arts. 15–24, (Nov. 21, 1947) (refraining from granting the ICJ the
authority to make law).
354 I.C.J. Statute, supra note 2, arts. 38(1)(d), 59.
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Essentially, he argues that the Court’s treating its own decisions as
sources of law is inherent in its nature as a permanently
established court.355 Acknowledging that, with respect to domestic
courts, the exercise of such power flows from the possession by
those courts of some elements of the overall sovereignty of the
state of whose government they form a part, he has asserted that
the states of the world have delegated to the Court the authority to
make law.356 The short answer to all these arguments is that, as the
creators of the Court, the states forming it presumably could limit
its powers as they chose, and that they have expressed those limits
in the terms of the Statute. The strict limits the Statute imposes on
the Court’s powers cannot be reconciled with some notion that the
Court was nonetheless intended to exercise the authority it has
claimed. Beyond these points, one element of Judge
Shahabuddeen’s discussion appears to contradict his conclusion.
He observes that “[n]ew cases sometimes influence the
development of state practice.”357 But, if decisions only sometimes
influence practice, it follows that, on other occasions, decisions do
not influence practice. If states ignore the Court’s decisions in their
practice, it would appear that a subsidiary means for the
determination of law, that is, the Court’s case law, is in conflict
with a primary source of law, that is, state practice. In such a case,
for the Court to rely on an earlier decision in later cases,
notwithstanding the states’ failure to conform their practice to that
decision, would appear to give a subsidiary source of law priority
over a primary source. That result seems difficult to justify.
To this point, this Section has argued that reliance on state
practice as a source of CIL can be justified, both as required by the
Statute and as consistent with the states’ capacity to represent their
populations and their control of very significant resources. In
contrast, the Court’s treating General Assembly resolutions, the
actions of conferences, determinations by expert bodies and its
own decisions as sources of law is not consistent with its Statute
and, further, accords such institutions power they are not granted
by their founding instruments. Beyond these points, however,
there is another—why does it make sense to treat particular
behaviors as sources of law? In other words, according to what

355
356
357

MOHAMED SHAHABUDDEEN, PRECEDENT IN THE WORLD COURT 40–41 (1996).
Id. at 93.
Id. at 209.
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legal theory is it reasonable to treat institutions generating
normative statements, i.e., statements of the form “X is forbidden,”
“Y is optional,” “Z is mandatory,” as creating law as opposed to
creating, for example, rules of games, or moral propositions, or
political positions?
This question is relatively easy to answer with respect to state
practice as a generator of CIL. First of all, aside from the Security
Council, there are no international institutions authorized to
impose binding rules on states. Hence, there is no occasion to ask
why practice-generated rules should be allowed to trump
institution created rules. Second, the International Law
Association’s formulation is enlightening. It will be recalled that
the International Law Association has provided the following
working definition of customary international law:
(i) Subject to the Sections which follow, a rule of
customary international law is one which is created and
sustained by the constant and uniform practice of States
and other subjects of international law in or impinging
upon their international legal relations, in circumstances
which give rise to a legitimate expectation of similar
conduct in the future.
(ii) If a sufficiently extensive and representative number of
States participate in such a practice in a consistent manner,
the resulting rule is one of “general customary international
law.” Subject to Section 15, such a rule is binding on all
States.358
This definition offers a plausible basis for attributing legal
effect to state practice seen as legally binding, that is, that such
practice creates expectations in other states. It also provides a
means for determining the legal effect of a given action, that is, by
inquiring as to the extent to which the action create a legitimate
expectation regarding future state behavior. To be sure, implicit in
that definition is the assumption of an unstated, basic principle—
that states ought not violate other states’ reasonable expectations.
As with the rule pacta sunt servanda, one cannot explain the
358 COMM. ON FORMATION OF CUSTOMARY (GENERAL) INT’L LAW, FINAL REPORT
OF THE COMMITTEE: STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES APPLICABLE TO THE FORMATION OF
GENERAL CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 8 (2000), available at http://www.ila

-hq.org/download.cfm/docid/A709CDEB-92D6-4CFA-A61C4CA30217F376.
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source of the obligation to apply this principle, though one can
note that, just as with pacta sunt servanda, the rule is one which
presumably seems a clear matter of common sense in most cultures
in the world.
When we turn to the non-practice based sources on which the
Court has relied, however, there is no equivalent theory. For
example, if one asks why any legal effect should be attributed to a
General Assembly resolution, one cannot respond that the General
Assembly is authorized to create such effects, because that is not
true. One can imagine a case in which states intend that votes by
their representatives would create legal effects, but there is no
evidence that such a case has existed, and there is considerable
reason to doubt that states have that intention in most cases. This
is not to say that it is impossible to generate a theory justifying the
attribution of legal effect to General Assembly resolutions; it is
only to say that it is not obvious what that theory would be, and
that, in any case, the Court has certainly put forward no such
theory to explain its reliance on formally non-binding sources.
3.3.3.

Analytical Technique

Questions regarding the Court’s analytical technique arise from
the extent to which it has arguably departed from what could be
called “judicial” modes of behavior in its judgments. In a few
cases, there is reason to fear that some judges’ negative attitudes
toward one of the litigants affected the resulting judgment,359 but
ultimately, these questions are more fundamental than concerns
about judicial bias.
In the first place, courts are expected to explain their
judgments. Not only do such explanations provide guidance to
those subject to the legal regime the Court is addressing, but they
359 See Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 314–
15 (June 27) (Schwebel, J., dissenting) (chastising former President of the Court,
Elias, of giving an interview to the Associated Press during the pendency of the
case in which he criticized the United States); id. at 179–80 (Elias, J., sep. opin.)
(“Apart from the slants given to my alleged remarks, I confirm that the gist of
what I am supposed to have said is quite correct and I very much regret the use
made of it in a Member of the Court’s dissenting opinion to a Judgment which
still confirms that the United States of America was found wrong by the Court
even under a new President, on all the essential points made by Nicaragua against
it.”); Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 161, 325 (Nov. 6) (Simma, J., sep. opin.)
(explaining that he has assented to an opinion he largely disagrees with because
he approves of the court’s actions in clearly delimiting the legal uses of force,
which, he implies, is to scold the United States).

368

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 31:2

make clear that the Court’s determination is based on existing law,
not on extraneous factors. Yet, as I have noted at length, the ICJ
not infrequently asserts the legal status of certain purported norms
without explaining the derivation of those norms, in circumstances
where the norm’s existence is not obvious. Some writers have
suggested that the collegial nature of the Court makes necessary
relatively sketchy opinions, in light of the difficulty of obtaining
agreement of a majority of judges on a thorough rationale.360 This
may be an explanation, but it is not an excuse. If the problem
arises from the structure of the Court, then the implication is that
the structure of the Court is defective, not that the problem does
not exist.
There are a number of examples of the difficulties that can be
created by Delphic judicial opinions. For example, as already
discussed, the Court in Nicaragua stated that a state’s noncompliance with a rule of CIL does not weaken the rule if the state
seeks to characterize its behavior as in some way not violating the
rule, even, apparently, if the characterization is in bad faith.361 This
statement implies that the states’ descriptions of their practice are
as important as the practice itself in determining the content of
CIL. This could not be true, however, if the rationale for ascribing
law-making effect to state practice is that such practice creates
reasonable expectations in other states that future practice will be
consistent with current practice, since it would hardly be
reasonable for one state to base its expectations regarding the
behavior of a second state on descriptions the first state knew to be
false. Therefore, the Court must be assuming that there is some
basis other than reasonable expectations for seeing practice as
capable of creating law. However, the Court never explains what
this basis is. Therefore, someone attempting to apply the Court’s
theory to determine the content of CIL would be unable to do so,
since there is no way to know the content of the theory.
Even more troubling is the failure of the Court, in some cases,
to acknowledge arguments, or elements of arguments, made by the
litigants. Among the principles of procedural fairness that seems
universal is the idea that each litigant deserves a hearing—not
simply an opportunity to present a case, but a right to have the
360 See, e.g., ROSENNE, supra note 11, at 1545–46 (“[G]iven that a judgment is
composed so as to reflect the common opinion of a majority of the judges,
economy of expression in the collective collegiate pronouncement is inevitable.”).
361 Military and Paramilitary Activities, 1986 I.C.J. at 98.
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decision-maker listen to the case as made. A corollary is that, if the
decision-maker rules against a litigant, it is because the decisionmaker has concluded that the litigant’s case is without merit and,
conversely, that the ruling would have been in the litigant’s favor if
the decision-maker had determined his argument to be
meritorious. If, however, a decision-maker ignores plausible
arguments made by a litigant, the decision-maker is failing to
explain the flaws in those arguments. Further, such a failure
inevitably creates the suspicion that the decision-maker acts as it
does because it cannot refute the arguments it ignores but does not
choose to admit their correctness, since to do so would require a
decision the opposite of that which it wishes to reach. However, a
decision that can be supported only by concealing the weakness of
the legal arguments against it must derive from some non-legal
considerations, not from the law—and a Court that decides cases
based on factors other than the law hardly acts as a court of law.
Of course, if this conclusion makes sense regarding a court’s failure
to respond to arguments contrary to its ultimate conclusion, it
makes even more sense regarding cases where the court bases its
conclusions on a flat misstatement of legally relevant facts.
These defects in the Court’s analyses undermine the rationale
for judicial resolution of interstate disputes. After all, the rationale
for urging states to take their disagreements to courts is the
assumption that, if the legal and factual elements of a dispute are
considered by an unbiased body whose only objective is to identify
and apply legal rules, the states affected by any resulting
judgments will see themselves as having been treated justly and
therefore be impelled to comply with the judges’ resolution of the
problem. Of course, there is obvious reason to wonder whether
states want a just, as opposed to a favorable, outcome to a dispute.
Even if one assumes that states want no more than justice,
however, they are unlikely to see themselves as having been
treated justly unless the international court to which they resort
makes its reasoning transparent, addresses the arguments
presented to it and refrains from misstating facts. If it fails in any
of these respects, a losing state must doubt the justice of the
treatment it received. And if legal institutions act unjustly while
lacking the power to coerce, what sense does it make to rely on
such institutions?
4. CONCLUSION
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This article has sought to demonstrate that the ICJ’s approach
to dealing with state practice, both as that practice pertains to CIL
and as it is relevant to the interpretation of particular treaties, is
seriously doubtful. The question now is, what ought to be the
response to this situation?
In one sense, governments have already responded—only 65
states accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court,362 and twothirds of the members of the U.N., including four of the five
permanent members of the Security Council do not accept that
jurisdiction. This relatively limited willingness to use the Court
surely, in part, reflects doubts about the way it functions.
But what about situations in which the case reaches the Court
under some other heading of jurisdiction, but the Court reaches a
clearly incorrect result due either to reliance on doubtful sources of
law or to obvious flaws in its analysis? Reisman has pointed out
that, prior to the 20th century, the awards of international arbitral
panels which exceeded their jurisdiction could be rejected by the
states subject to the award on the grounds of excès de pouvoir,363 and
has suggested that, in light of what he has characterized as the
Court’s failure to adhere to the internal control mechanisms
intended to limit its exercise of authority, its judgments could be
ignored on analogous grounds.364
This approach seems difficult to reconcile with Article 59 of the
Statute, but may be the least bad alternative. A government’s first
responsibility is to its people, not to the Court. If compliance with
a judgment would impose significant costs on a state and the
judgment was flagrantly incorrect, it would seem that compliance
with a such a judgment would be difficult to defend—it would
amount to the government treating its responsibilities to its
population as less important than its undertaking to respect a
judgment, the poor quality of which was itself evidence that
neither the judgment nor the Court rendering it deserved respect.
The flaws in the Court’s methods described in this Article
ought to have consequences among commentators as well as
among governments. These consequences should take the form of
avoiding attributing to the Court more authority than its Statute
362 See International Court of Justice, Report of the International Court of Justice 1
August 2006–31 July 2007, U.N. GAOR, 62nd Sess., Supp. (No. 4) U.N. Doc.
A/62/4 (Aug. 1, 2007).
363 REISMAN, supra note 346, at 11–12.
364 Id. at 41–45.
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accords it or than its performance merits. In books and articles too
numerous to mention, commentators describe the Court’s view of
the law as to a particular subject as “authoritative” or describe a
disagreement over the content of the law as “settled” once the
Court comes down on one side or the other of the disagreement.
Nothing in the Statute purports to invest in the Court the authority
to, in effect, determine the content of international law outside the
context of a particular case. Nor does the Court’s performance
justify any assumption that its majorities are knowledgeable
enough, judicious enough, or disinterested enough to make it
reasonable to base deference to it on the collective wisdom it has
shown, whatever its formal authority.
Many involved in international law will object to these
suggestions. In some cases this reaction may represent nothing
more than support for the Court because of agreement with its
results, however doubtful those results may be as matters of law.
But it must be acknowledged that there will be disinterested
arguments against this position as well. How, it might be asked,
can states be brought to respect international law if the principal
court applying international law is treated with disrespect? And if
the Court’s judgments do not settle disputed doctrinal points, how
can they be settled?
The response is that states have shown their lack of regard for
the Court through their unwillingness to rely on it. A refusal to
confront possible reasons for that reaction will not somehow
induce states to alter their behavior. Certainly, outside the area of
maritime delimitation, it is difficult to identify a subject as to which
the Court’s decisions appear to have influenced the behavior of
states very much. And while there is no denying the
inconvenience presented by the lack of means for the international
legal system to finally resolve doctrinal controversies, the
convenience of having a means to resolve such disagreements does
not and cannot somehow create the authority to do so improperly.
Most fundamentally, according the Court more authority than
can be reconciled with the language of the Statute and the quality
of its performance presents a danger to international law. If there
are serious questions about the functioning of a tribunal
purporting to apply international law, there is a risk that the
problem will be thought to lie, not in the court, but in the body of
law in question. Reasons to avoid the Court can thus become
reasons to ignore the law. Further, the Court can defend itself in
such circumstances only by arguing that its results are correct—
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that is, that the flawed rules the Court has applied really are the
law. If that approach is taken, however, it can only strengthen
arguments that the law “is a ass”—and the consequences that
would follow seem obvious.
The current situation is one in which states pay little attention
to the Court, which in turn means that it can have little effect on
international law as it plays out in the world beyond the academy.
Surely, the world would be better off it there was an international
court to which states paid attention, even if the price of that
attention was the Court’s limiting its role to applying the rules that
states have authorized it to apply.

